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TOWARDS AN ARCHITECTURE FOR SECURE PRIVACY-PRESERVING
OPPORTUNISTIC RESOURCE UTILIZATION NETWORKS

Ahmed A. Al-Gburi, Ph.D.
Western Michigan University, 2019

The paradigm of Opportunistic Resource Utilization Networks (oppnets) advances
technology in the field of ad hoc networks. The salient feature of oppnets is their use of
“helpers” to expand opportunistically when the need for more resources or capabilities
arises. Like any other pervasive computing systems, oppnets face numerous security and
privacy challenges. These challenges are addressed by utilizing two major ideas: Pervasive
Trust Foundation (PTF) and Active Data Bundles (ADBs). The PTF paradigm makes trust
the basis for security and privacy in pervasive computing systems, including oppnets. The
ADBs are self-protecting data constructs that encapsulate together—in an inseparable
way—sensitive data, metadata (including privacy and other policies), and a virtual machine
(including a policy enforcer).
We propose a Secure Privacy-Preserving Oppnet (SP2O) system, which integrates
two smaller systems also proposed here: PTF-based Oppnets Architecture (POA) and
ADB-based Oppnet Scheme (AOS). We present conceptual designs for the POA and AOS
systems. POA ensures secure interactions among various oppnet entities in the face of its
ad hoc growth. AOS protects sensitive data exchanged among all entities of an oppnet
during its entire lifecycle. The proposed work is targeted at investigating the feasibility and
effectiveness of the proposed SP2O system.
We evaluate SP2O using trust ratings for oppnet components within the SP2O
framework, comparing SP2O to a baseline system – one not using trust ratings. Simulation
experiments, implemented using C#, consider performance overhead introduced by SP2O.
The experiments use two measures: success rates in completing a job and average times to
complete a job. (The job involves using an oppnet in an emergency scenario in which a
passerby needs the 9-1-1 service but is unable to call it herself.) The results show that SP2O

introduces a 20% overhead (decrease) in success rates and a 23% overhead (increase) in
average times to succeed. These overheads are the cost paid for improving security in terms
of protecting SP2O from attacks by admitted helpers. Therefore, we have a tradeoff
between a security gain and a system performance cost.
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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

1.1. Chapter Overview
This chapter presents a quick overview of the Dissertation and then presents the definitions
and basic terms used in the Dissertation. The chapter provides background information on
Opportunistic Resource Utilization Networks (oppnets). It then presents the motivation for this
research. The chapter also provides background information on Pervasive Trust Foundation and
Active Data Bundles. Next, it presents the problem statement and the research hypothesis, and the
scope and limitations of the proposed research. The major contribution of this research is also
presented. Finally, the chapter explains the organization of this Dissertation.

1.2. Overview of the Dissertation
The paradigm of Opportunistic Resource Utilization Networks (oppnets) proposes an advanced
technology in the area of ad hoc networks. The salient feature of oppnets is their use of “helpers”
to expand opportunistically when the need for more resources or capabilities arises. Like any other
pervasive computing systems, oppnets face numerous security and privacy challenges.
Investigation of security and privacy in oppnets was delayed until working out their basic
structure and operations. Now, these challenges are addressed by utilizing two major ideas:
Pervasive Trust Foundation (PTF) and Active Data Bundles (ADBs). The PTF paradigm makes
trust the basis for security and privacy in pervasive computing systems, including oppnets. The
ADBs are self-protecting data mechanisms that encapsulate together—in an inseparable way—
sensitive data, metadata (including privacy and other policies), and a virtual machine (including a
policy enforcer). We believe that the PTF and ADBs can be used for an effective and efficient
solution to improve protection of security and privacy for oppnets and its sensitive data.
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To the best of our knowledge, this research is the first attempt to use pervasive trust foundation
(PTF) and active data bundles (ADBs) to provide a proper security and data privacy solution for
oppnets (and more limited opportunistic networks). Therefore, we propose a Secure PrivacyPreserving Oppnet (SP2O) architecture, which integrates two smaller systems also proposed here:
PTF-based Oppnets Architecture (POA) and ADB-based Oppnet Scheme (AOS).
The proposed SP2O system integrates designing for both the POA and AOS systems. POA
ensures secure interactions between various oppnet entities in the face of its ad hoc growth. AOS
protects oppnet sensitive data exchanged among all entities of an oppnet during its entire lifecycle.
We believe that the proposed SP2O system meets most of the oppnet requirements in terms of
security and privacy. We develop a simulation for the first part (POA) in SP2O and obtained
required results. While, the second part (AOS) of SP2O is still targeted at investigating the
feasibility and effectiveness.

1.3. Definitions and Basic Terms
This section presents the essential definitions and basic terms used in this Dissertation, divided
into oppnet-related terms, terms related to pervasive trust foundation, and terms related to active
data bundles.

1.3.1. Oppnet-Related Terms
The following oppnet-related terms used in this Dissertation require definitions:
Opportunistic resource utilization networks (oppnets) — a new paradigm for a generalization
of ad hoc networks, and grow by discovering and integrating as their helpers (foreign devices or
systems) that possess desired resources. The basic idea is that helpers can improve or speed up the
applications run by an oppnet. The prominent feature of oppnets is their use of helpers to expand
in an opportunistic manner.
Helper — an entity that can assist an oppnet in its activities, and accepts an invitation to help
oppnet. Before it joins an oppnet, a future helper is a candidate helper; a candidate helper can
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possess diverse capabilities and “skills” potentially useful for the oppnet (such as specialized
software, communication, computing, storing, sensing or actuating capabilities). A helper, selected
from among (potentially a broad set of) candidate helpers and integrated into an oppnet, becomes
an actual helper.
Seed oppnet (a.k.a a seed or seed nodes) — a pre-designed (not ad hoc) collection of nodes that
initiate oppnet activity. A seed can be as small as a single node.
Expanded oppnet — the process of oppnet expansion, which begins as a seed and grows into an
expanded oppnet by inviting, admitting, and integrating new helpers.
Control center (CC) — an arbitrary subset of seed nodes that responsible for managing all
interactions and processing of oppnet activities. Among others, CC can decide to start the process
of oppnet expansion (growth).
Oppnet Virtual Machine (OVM) — an oppnet middleware/software that consists of a collection
of primitive functions called OVM primitives (OVMPs). In general, different subsets of OVMPs
can be installed on different oppnet-based or oppnet-enabled entities (defined next).
Oppnet-based entities — systems or devices that include OVM primitives by design, and thus are
capable of oppnet activities, including communicating with other oppnet-based or so-called
oppnet-enabled entities.
Oppnet-enabled entities — entities that—after downloading and installing a required subset of
OVM primitives in an ad hoc manner—are capable of oppnet activities, including communicating
with other oppnet-based or oppnet-enabled entities.
Oppnet security and privacy — Security in oppnets involves assuring secure interactions among
oppnet entities, which are communicating to collaborate on achieving specific tasks. This requires
many verification processes such as authentication, authorization, integrity checks, etc. Privacy in
oppnets protects sensitive information of the interacting entities and assures that this information
stays confidential, that is, it is not disclosed to unauthorized parties.
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1.3.2. Terms Related to Pervasive Trust Foundation
The following terms related to pervasive trust foundation used in this Dissertation require
definitions:
Pervasive Trust Foundation (PTF) — a paradigm that involves two major principles. First, trust
should be used as a foundation for security and privacy (as well as many other services not
considered in this chapter, such as collaboration or routing). Second, trust should be considered as
pervasive in computing systems, and must be considered either explicitly—in large or open
systems (such as oppnets); or implicitly—in small or closed systems.

1.3.3. Terms Related to Active Data Bundles
The following terms related to terms related to active data bundles used in this Dissertation
require definitions:
Active Data Bundle (ADB) — a self-protecting mechanism that used to protect sensitive data
from unauthorized disclosure, and limiting access to subjects’ sensitive data by authorized parties
during their dissemination among different parties. The ADB encapsulates (wraps) sensitive data
(to be protected) with metadata and a virtual machine (VM).
•

Sensitive data represent a digital content that needs to be protected from unauthorized accesses
(including documents, code, images, audio, video, etc.).

•

Metadata contain information that describes sensitive data and their use (including, among
others, all privacy policies for the sensitive data).

•

Virtual machine (VM) controls and manages how an ADB executing it behaves. The VM
makes its ADB active performing essential functions and operations (including, among others,
data integrity, and enforcement of privacy policies and data dissemination rules specified by
metadata).
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1.4. Background Information on Oppnets
Opportunistic Resource Utilization Networks (a.k.a. oppnets) are a paradigm for special kind of
networks that grow by discovering foreign entities (systems or devices that are not a part of the
current oppnet) that possess desired resources, and integrating them into oppnets as helpers
[LKBG06]. This expansion by finding helpers in an opportunistic and ad hoc way is the most
distinctive feature of oppnets.
In this section, we provide background information on oppnets, including basic oppnet structure
and operations, oppnet helpers and their categories, oppnet virtual machine and its generations, and
a discussion of security and privacy challenges in oppnets.

1.4.1. Basic Oppnet Structure and Operations
This subsection shows the basic oppnet structure and its activities operations as follows:
Oppnet Structure. An oppnet consists of three major types of components/nodes (cf. [LiGY07,
KLGY08, LGKY10]) as shown in Fig. 1.1:
1) Seed nodes—a set of oppnet nodes constituting the Seed Oppnet, employed together at the time
of the initial oppnet deployment. It might be very small, in the extreme a single node.
2) Control Center (CC) nodes—a subset of oppnet nodes implementing together a distributed
Control Center, responsible for managing all interactions and processing, including oppnet
growth and shrinking (e.g., when removing malicious nodes from an oppnet).
3) Helper nodes—nodes that were originally “foreign” but became “integrated” into an oppnet to
assist it in reaching its desired goals. For example, the Expanded Oppnet in Fig. 1.1b, admitted
the following helpers (counterclockwise from bottom left): (a) a computer network, wired to
Internet; (b) a cellphone infrastructure (represented by the cellphone tower), contacted via
oppnet’s cellphone peripheral; (c) a satellite, contacted via a direct satellite link; (d) a home
area network, contacted via an intelligent appliance (e.g., a refrigerator) with a wireless link;
(e) a microwave network, contacted via a microwave relay; (f) body area networks (BANs) of
the occupants of an overturned car, contacted via OnStar [LiGY07].
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Figure 1.1. Oppnet growth from (a) a Seed Oppnet into (b) an Expanded Oppnet
[LiGY07].
Oppnet Operations. The control center (CC) manages growing of a Seed Oppnet (Fig. 1.1a) into
an Expanded Oppnet (Fig. 1.1b). The process involves looking for using foreign entities and
admitting them to help in the realization of the oppnet goals. An entity that accepts an invitation
to help makes an obligation to keep on helping as long as the oppnet needs it, and becomes a
helper. When a helper completes its tasks, it is released from its obligation by the oppnet and is
free to return to its original duties [LGKY10].
The basic sequence of oppnet operations is summarized in Fig. 2. A distributed control center
(a.k.a. Decentralized Command Center) supervises the operations of its oppnet throughout the
entire oppnet’s life. If an oppnet needs more resources to achieve its goals, the cycle of oppnet
growth (including discovering, evaluating, admitting, and integrating candidate helpers) is
repeated. Once the goals of an oppnet are achieved, the oppnet assists the helpers in restoring their
state they were in before joining oppnet, and releases them [LKBG06, LiGY07, LGKY10].

6

Figure 1.2. Basic oppnet operations (cf. (LGKY10]).

1.4.2. Oppnet Helpers and Their Categories
An entity that is sufficiently capable to download and install a minimal subset of oppnet
middleware modules necessary to contact oppnets becomes oppnet-enabled. Any oppnet-enabled
entity is a potential helper [LGKY10]. A helper can possess diverse capabilities and “skills”
potentially useful for the oppnets such as specialized software, communication, computing,
storing, sensing or actuating capabilities [LKBG06, LiGY07].
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The oppnet helpers generally can be classified into three main categories [LGKY10, LKGW11,
AlLi15] as follows:
1) Potential Helpers—are a set of oppnet-enabled devices within reach of an oppnet, which may
serve it as future helpers. Lilien et al. [LGKY10] state:
The set of potential helpers for oppnets is very broad, including communication,
computing and sensor systems, wired and wireless, free-standing and
embedded. As pervasive computing progresses, the candidate pool will
continue increasing dramatically: in infrastructures, buildings, vehicles,
appliances, etc.
2) Candidate Helpers—are a subset of potential helpers that meet the needs of an oppnet duty,
which are asked/ordered to join an oppnet (in ordinary/critical situations, resp.).
3) Actual Helpers—are a subset of the candidate helpers selected and admitted by an oppnet.
Actual helpers (usually referred to simply as helpers) can be categorized into two dimensions.
The first dimension includes regular helpers and lightweight helpers [LKBG06, LiGY07,
LKBG07, AlLi15]:
a) Regular helpers—which can discover, invite, and admit other helpers; they provide
significant resources to the oppnet that admitted them.
b) Lightweight helpers (a.k.a. lites)—which have very limited resources, including very
restricted communication capabilities (usually due to their weak native hardware/software
capabilities).
The second dimension includes either voluntary helpers or reservist helpers as defined below
[LiGY07, LKBG07, AlLi15]:
c) Voluntary helpers (a.k.a. ad hoc)—that must be asked for help, and are free to refuse
(possibly except the cases when an oppnet requesting help faces a life-or-death situation).
d) Reservist helpers (a.k.a. reservists)—that can be ordered to assist an oppnet requesting for
help, and are obliged to comply (can be subject to appropriate penalties if they refuse to
help).
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1.4.3. Oppnet Virtual Machine and Their Generations
The Oppnet Virtual Machine (OVM) is a collection of primitive functions that aims first of all
to create a universal middleware/software for application-level communication within and among
oppnets (this communication is then the basis for opportunistic utilization of all resources)
[LKBG06, LGKY10]. OVM primitives can be downloaded to any device or entity to make it
oppnet-enabled, that is, able to communicate and share resources with other oppnets or oppnetenabled. OVM is envisioned as a standard for assisting oppnet application development,
facilitating widespread use of oppnets.
There are three OVM generations:
First-Generation OVM (MicroOppnet v.2.2).

A first-generation OVM is a monolithic

MicroOppnet v.2.2 [LKBG06, LiGY07, KGLY07, LGKY10] built as a small-scale system.
MicroOppnet v.2.2 was constructed as a proof of concept and a testbed for oppnets. It not only
allows opportunistic communications but also facilitates sensing by opportunistically accesses
sensor nodes (sensor network). Since sensing is the only resource utilized, MicroOppnet v.2.2 is
elementary (undeveloped) in its resource utilization opportunism.
In this OVM generation, Lilien et al. [LGKY10] defined a separate set of primitives (firstgeneration OVM primitives—included in Appendix A) for each of the oppnet node classes (seed
nodes, CC nodes, regular helper nodes, and lite helper nodes). The two main benefits of defining
separate primitives for the four categories of the oppnet nodes are improved security and saving
of resources.
Second-Generation OVM (MicroOppnet v.4). A second-generation OVM is a modified (or
upgraded) version of the original first-generation of OVM and its primitives, in order to ensure
their completeness and consistency. MicroOppnet v.4 is represented the second-generation OVM
which develops monolithic MicroOppnet v.2.2 by adding new OVM primitives through modifying
the functionality of original primitives, and removing some existing OVM primitives to avoid
redundancies. These modifications were required for MicroOppnet v.4 to make it more compatible
and modular, as well as non-overlapping OVM functionality [Aldu15].
Even though the set of the second generation OVM primitives were already constructed, but
MicroOppnet v.4 was implemented and simulated in a monolithic fashion using the same
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MicroOppnet v.2.2 architecture (structure and operations), without using the designed OVM
primitives within the simulation code [AlLi15, Aldu15]. A partial list of the second generation
OVM primitives for CC, seed, and regular helper are included respectively in Appendix A. The
primitives for lite helpers (nodes) are very similar to the primitives for helpers, and are therefore
omitted.
Third-Generation OVM (MicroOppnet v.5). A third generation OVM is a modular (nonmonolithic) introduced to make oppnets much easier, clearer and scalable [AlLi15, Aldu15]. Both
former generations were critically evaluated and implemented by Alduailij [Aldu15]. She also
improved that the third generation OVM primitives by making the OVM primitives incorporated
object-oriented techniques (since the sequential nature of the first and second OVM primitives do
not suitable with the object-oriented languages used by most developers); designed and
implemented in a non-overlapping minimally overlapping manner; and included modularity,
inheritance, and polymorphism features [Aldu15, AlLi15].
Therefore, the earlier pioneer implementations of OVM primitives had to concentrate on
assuring the proper basic functionality, excluding security and privacy considerations (the authors
where fully aware of the necessity of providing security and privacy in the successive
implementations, and indicated it as a necessary condition for making oppnets practically useful)
(cf. [Aldu15, AlLi15]). The key challenge and the focus of this Dissertation is defining and
developing a set of OVM primitives assuring security and privacy for oppnets (which will be
discussed in more detail in Chapter 6).
For this reason, we used MicroOppnet v.5 as a basis for our baseline system (MicroOppnet
v.5.2). Further details are included for the developing third-generation of OVM primitives and
MicroOppnet v.5.2 in Chapter 4.

1.4.4. Oppnet Security and Privacy Challenges
Providing controls for security and privacy challenges is crucial for oppnets, oppnet-enabled
applications, and their users. In fact, Lilien et al. [LiKG06, LGKY10] have gone as far as referring
to the security and privacy challenges as the “make it or break it” issue. Oppnets like most other
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non-trivial technologies can be malevolent—deployed to harm humans, their artifacts, and their
technical infrastructures.
Oppnets can be viewed as middleware for generalization of ad hoc networks or systems, and,
therefore, they inherit all security and privacy challenges of ad hoc networks. Lilien et al.
[LKBG06] presented six security and privacy challenges that must be investigated to assure
security and privacy for oppnets and their sensitive data. These challenges are: (a) increasing trust
and secure routing; (b) helper privacy and oppnet privacy; (c) protecting data privacy; (d) ensuring
data integrity; (e) identifying most dangerous attacks and sketching solutions; and (f) intrusion
detection.
We concentrate on protecting security and privacy of data in oppnets. We consider various
kinds of threats and attacks, including both outsider1 attacks — from the outside of an oppnet, and
insider2 attacks—from within an oppnet. Attacks include denial of service (DoS), eavesdropping,
information leakage, ID spoofing, man-in-the-middle (MITM) attacks, black hole and packetdropping (gray hole) attacks, wormholes, etc. [LKBG06, LiKG06]. For instance, MITM may occur
when a node sends a help request to rescuers, and a malicious node alters this help message. These
oppnet security and privacy threats and attacks are explained in more detail in Chapter 2.
An oppnet should also prevent a malicious entity from joining as a helper. In addition, any
foreign or oppnet entity may either maliciously or inadvertently reveal or destroy sensitive data.
Since motivations of attackers cannot be known for sure, even inadvertent disclosures of sensitive
data—e.g., not malicious but just selfish [BuHu07]—must be treated as an attack.

1.5. Research Motivation
Three key motivational factors influenced this research. First, the security and privacy
challenges are crucial for oppnets, oppnet-enabled applications, and their users. It is worth

1

Outsider attacks: These are external attacks carried out by the unauthorized nodes which are not a part of the oppnets
yet. For example, candidate helper nodes that do not belong to the domain of oppnet, but it penetrates the oppnet
area to launch its attack. The outsider and insider attacks are explained in more detail in Section 2.3).

2

Insider attacks: These are internal attacks caused by the authorized nodes that are part of the oppnet (including for
example some malicious candidate helpers or limited to some actual helpers).
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mentioning here that without appropriate security and proper privacy protection built into any
emerging technology (such as oppnets), it will be strongly criticized or even rejected by the users,
as being unable to satisfy the essential requirements for any computing system [LKBG06].
The second factor is that Alduailij and Lilien [Aldu15, AlLi15] designed and implemented the
third-generation of OVM primitives concentrating on the feasibility of OVM and its analysis and
validation [Aldu15], excluding security and privacy considerations. Instead, the following item is
listed for the future work [Aldu15]:
Integrating privacy and security techniques into the development of the OVM
primitives. Privacy methodologies would protect sensitive data (such as the
helpObject containing personal information) transmitted among nodes from
being exposed to unauthorized entities. Security techniques will protect oppnet
applications and oppnet nodes from attacks of malicious nodes.
Finally, to the best of our knowledge this research is the first attempt to utilize pervasive trust
foundation (PTF) and active data bundles (ADBs)—both discussed next—in order to provide a
proper security and data privacy solution for oppnets (and more limited opportunistic networks).
Therefore, regarding to the security and privacy threats and attacks on oppnets (mentioned
above), the following security and privacy requirements should be considered for oppnets:
1) Authentication, authorization, and access control: To avoid malicious node or unauthorized
oppnet entities to apply ID spoofing, unauthorized access, and other threats and attacks,
effective authentication, authorization, and access control mechanisms should be established
considering the characteristics of oppnets. This ensures that a malicious node cannot
masquerade as a trusted oppnet node.
2) Verification and availability processes: To verify that potential helpers that invited to join an
oppnet (especially in the oppnet growth process), are not malicious. In other words, this ensures
that the desired oppnet services are available whenever they are needed, despite threats and
attacks. This can only be achieved if there are several verification processes available to admit
new helpers in the oppnets.
3) Pervasive trust foundation (PTF) for oppnets: To obtain the availability and resist malicious
dropping in oppnets, PTF can be used to ensure secure interactions among oppnet entities. The
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PTF paradigm should be designed in an effective and efficient manner, to evaluate the level of
trust among oppnet enabled devices. In addition, trust here can be used as a foundation for
other security and privacy services (as well as many other services not emphasized in this
research, such as collaboration or routing). It considers our proposed system to be discussed in
this chapter.
4) Data confidentiality and integrity: It is a core security and privacy requirement for oppnets.
Data confidentiality ensures that a given oppnet data message cannot be understood by any
malicious eavesdropper (or unauthorized entity) else than its desired destination(s). While data
integrity needs to ensure that transmitted data must be not modified or altered throughout their
entire lifecycle in oppnets. This requirement is typically enabled by using a powerful
encryption mechanism to encrypt transmitted data. We believe that utilize ADB mechanism
makes it impossible for an attacker to gain valuable sensitive oppnet data, as will be explained
later.

1.6. Background Information on the Pervasive Trust
Foundation (PTF)
The Pervasive Trust Foundation (PTF) is a paradigm that uses trust as the basis for security
and privacy in computing systems [LiAB09, LiAB10]. PTF involves two major principles. First,
trust should be used as a foundation for security and privacy (as well as many other services not
considered in this chapter, such as collaboration or routing). Second, trust should be considered as
pervasive in computing systems, and must be considered either explicitly—in large or open
systems (such as Oppnets); or implicitly—in small or closed systems.
A PTF module processes trust information for its oppnet. Trust value (Tv) that Entity O (e.g.,
oppnet’s control center) currently has for Entity H (e.g., an actual helper) determines the set of
actions that Entity H is authorized by Entity O to perform. Entity O calculates Tv for Entity H
based on Entity O’s direct experience with Entity H as well as reputation information (“indirect
experience”) obtained by Entity O about Entity H from other entities.
Trust level for an oppnet entity must be re-evaluated with appropriate frequency since it
changes dynamically over time.
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1.7. Background Information on the Active Data Bundles
(ADBs)
An Active Data Bundle (ADB), also known as an active bundle (AB), is a self-protecting data
mechanism that encapsulates sensitive data with metadata and a virtual machine [LiBh06,
BeLi09]. The structure of an ADB is shown in Fig. 3. Sensitive Data are data that must be protected
from unauthorized access. Metadata contain all policies to be enforced, which include privacy
policies, operational policies, trust verification policies, integrity verification policies, access
control policies, application-dependent policies, and other policies. The Virtual Machine (VM)
performs all major ADB activities, which among others enforce policies specified in metadata
[BenO10].

Figure 1.3. The basic structure of an Active Data Bundle [BeLi09].
Historically, a precursor of the ADB was initially proposed by Lilien and Bhargava [LiBh06].
The authors proposed privacy-preserving data dissemination (P2D2) scheme, which enables
enhanced control of data by its owner. It relies on the ideas of bundling sensitive data with
metadata, adaptive evaporation (partial self-destruction) of the bundles, in suspect environments,
and apoptosis (complete self-destruction) of endangered bundles in dangerous situations. The
metadata includes privacy policies defined for the sensitive data. The goal of the P2D2 scheme is
to encapsulate and protect sensitive data throughout their full lifecycle. Ben Othmane and Lilien
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[BeLi09] extended the P2D2 scheme by adding a virtual machine (VM) to the data-metadata
bundle, and thus defined the Active Bundle or AB (later renamed Active Data Bundle or ADB).
An ADB can be transferred from its origination node to its destination node via a sequence of
intermediate nodes. The intermediate and destination nodes are collectively known as visited hosts.
The main function of an ADB is protecting its sensitive data from unauthorized disclosure and
unauthorized dissemination during the entire ADB lifecycle. The ADB lifecycle begins with ADB
creation and continues through ADB dissemination to ADB destruction (via evaporation or
apoptosis operations) [BenO10]. An evaporation means the irretrievable destruction of this portion
(or these portions) of the sensitive data that are threatened with being compromised by
unauthorized visited hosts. Apoptosis means that, in case of a threat of having its sensitive data
exposed, an ADB self-destroys irretrievably and completely (including all its components: data
metadata and VM). In our research, we employ ADBs and their capabilities to protect sensitive
data in oppnets.

1.8. Problem Statement and Research Hypothesis
Problem Statement — The problem to be addressed in this research can be stated as follows:
Security of interactions among oppnet entities and privacy of data in oppnets
are threatened by malicious or inadvertent security or privacy attacks
performed by outsiders (including candidate helpers) or insiders (including
compromised seed nodes and helpers).
Research Hypothesis — Our research hypothesis which addresses the above problem, can be
stated as follows:
Security of interactions among oppnet entities can be enhanced by using
Pervasive Trust Foundation (PTF). Privacy of data in oppnets can be protected
by enforcing owners’ privacy policies for sensitive oppnet data using the Active
Data Bundle (ADB) scheme. A system utilizing PTF and ADB improves
protection of oppnet interactions and data.

15

1.9. Scope and Limitations of the Proposed Research
This section discusses the scope and the limitations of the proposed research in this
Dissertation. The scope of research defines the domain of the study. The limitations of research
identify concerns considered to be beyond the scope of research.
Scope of Research. The scope of research can be summarized as follows:
1) Identify the components of oppnets vital for its security and privacy (cf. [Aldu15]). (We start
with the oppnet middleware implemented in MicroOppnet v.5 using the third-generation OVM
primitives as our baseline system.)
2) Analyze data structures used by oppnets.
3) Classify data within oppnets into sensitive and non-sensitive.
4) Identify the most critical threats and attacks on data in oppnets.
5) Protect security and privacy for sensitive oppnet data.
6) Utilize the Pervasive Trust Foundation (PTF) for assuring secure interactions among oppnet
entities.
7) Investigate the need for developing Active Data Bundles (ADBs) for protecting privacy of data
in oppnets.
8) Integrate Active Data Bundles (ADBs) within the OVM primitives.
9) Evaluate effectiveness and efficiency of the proposed SP2O system for protecting security and
privacy of data in oppnets.
Limitations of Research. We are aware of a few limitations that are beyond the scope of this
Dissertation, and must be left for future investigation. The major limitations are as follows:
1) We consider privacy and security only for sensitive oppnet data, not for any other entities (such
as users, helpers, applications, etc.). Sensitive data can reside on all types of oppnet nodes, that
is, seed nodes, CC nodes, and helper nodes.
2) Security of communication among oppnet nodes is out of scope for this research.
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3) Security of oppnet nodes (including helpers and candidate helpers is out of the scope of this
Dissertation.
4) We also assume that seed oppnet nodes are always honest, never malicious. This means, the
security and privacy protection for these nodes is perfect (hardware, software, and data are
perfectly secure).
5) We do not consider all oppnet entities in this research, but only the entities contacted by an
oppnet as potential helpers (or candidate helpers).
6) Our implementation of the OVM primitives is limited by using only some of the possible types
of entities (systems and devices) in our baseline system (cf. Chapter 4).

1.10. Main Dissertation Contributions
The major contributions of this Dissertation include the following:
1) Design of an architecture for the proposed system called a Secure Privacy-Preserving Oppnet
(SP2O) system, which includes (cf. Chapter 6):
a) Helper Lifecycle State Diagram—which defines the behavior of each helper nodes (as
presented in Section 6.2.1).
b) An enhanced set of OVM primitives—which boosts the security and privacy requirements
of oppnets and the oppnet entities that interact with (as presented in Section 6.2.2).
c) PTF-based Oppnets Architecture (POA)—which ensures secure interactions among
various helper oppnet nodes in the face of its ad hoc growth (as presented in Section 6.2.3).
d) ADB-based Oppnet Scheme (AOS)—which protects sensitive data exchanged among
oppnet entities during its entire lifecycle (as presented in Section 6.2.4).
2) Design of a simulation for the baseline system (i.e., without using PTF) and running it (cf.
Chapter 5).
3) Design of a simulation for the proposed SP2O system (i.e., using PTF) and running it (cf.
Chapter 6).
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4) Comparison of the proposed SP2O system to the baseline system to find the overhead paid for
using PTF in the proposed SP2O system. The overhead introduced by using PTF in SP2O is
the cost of improving security and privacy of the oppnet. (cf. Chapter 7).

1.11. Dissertation Organization
The rest of the Dissertation is organized as the following. Chapter 2 presents a literature review
of networks and concepts related to oppnets, a review of security and privacy threats in oppnets,
and a review of security and privacy controls for oppnets. Chapter 3 introduces our research
methodology which includes definition of research methodology, research process, and research
tools used in the Dissertation. Chapter 4 explains the design of the baseline system which includes
a description, an architecture, and challenges and limitations of the baseline system. Chapter 5
introduces the simulation design for the baseline system. Chapter 6 explains the design of the
proposed SP2O system and its simulation. Chapter 7 presents performance evaluation, describing
simulation results and discussing them. Finally, Chapter 8 presents conclusions, indicates the
significance and expected impact of this work, and outlines the future work.
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CHAPTER 2

LITERATURE REVIEW

2.1. Introduction
This chapter reviews networks and some other concepts most relevant to oppnets and discusses
the similarities and differences between them. We then review the most important security and
privacy threats and attacks in oppnets. Then, we outline previous security and privacy solutions
for oppnets. We additionally present previous work that considers trust as a foundation for security
and privacy. Finally, we discuss using the ADB for protecting sensitive data in other systems.

2.2. A Review of Networks and Concepts Related to
Oppnets
This section categorizes into two main subsections: networks related to oppnets and other
concepts related to oppnets. For each subsection, we review the most important networks and
systems that are most relevant to oppnets, and discusses the similarities and differences between
them.

2.2.1. Networks Related to Oppnets
This subsection reviews the networks that are most relevant to oppnets. We then discuss the
major differences between oppnets and these networks.
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2.2.1.1. Mobile Ad Hoc Networks (MANETs)
Mobile Ad Hoc Networks (MANETs) are decentralized networks consisting of an autonomous
collection of mobile user nodes that can communicate with each other using wireless
communication channels. The nodes in a MANET topology can dynamically join and leave the
network, rapidly, often without warning, and maybe without interruption of communications to
other nodes. Since MANET is decentralized, the nodes are responsible for all activities of the
network such as discovering the network’s topology, self-configuration, and routing (dynamically
be setup anywhere and anytime) [Siva11, SiKV12]. We review some following examples of
protocols based on this kind of the MANET topology.
Khoriba et al. [KhLJ12] propose a cross-layer protocol mobility‐aware routing and
interference‐aware topology control (MRIT) that jointly considers routing and topology control
are taking mobility and interference into account for MANETs. The main goal of the proposed
protocol is to increase the network lifetime, preserve energy, and find stable end‐to‐end routes for
MANETs. The authors evaluate the performance of the MRIT by simulating a set of random
MANET environments. As another example that attempts to enhance the Quality of Service (QoS)
communications over MANETs, Obaidat et al. [OASO13] propose QoS-Aware Multipath Routing
Protocol (QMRP). The proposed protocol considers projected load into route quality computation
to provide a more accurate measure of the realistic delay as well as maintaining loop freedom of
multiple node-disjoint paths using neighbor hop list.
We believe that MANETs shares the self-configuration feature with oppnets as both are
decentralized. However, the oppnet nodes can realize more challenging tasks than selfconfiguration and routing, since helper, oppnet nodes are responsible for sharing their resources to
assist an oppnets in achieving its goal. Another distinguishing factor is the obligation of oppnet
nodes to keep assisting till the oppnet mission is accomplished, while in MANETs nodes can join
and leave a network without any restrictions.
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2.2.1.2. Opportunistic Networks
Opportunistic Networks (e.g., [PePC06, CGMP10]) are a proper subset of our oppnets used in
this Dissertation, where opportunism is usually limited to a small subset of oppnet capabilities
(such as only opportunistic communication capabilities, or opportunistic message forwarding).
Pelusi et al. [PePC06] and Conti et al. [CGMP10] consider opportunistic networks as one of
the most interesting evolutions of Mobile Ad Hoc Networks (MANETs), characterized by selforganizing networking, and the store-carry-and-forward paradigm. In opportunistic networks,
mobile nodes are enabled to communicate with each other even if a route connecting them never
exists. Specifically, node mobility is exploited as an opportunity to deliver data among
disconnected parts of a network. Therefore, routes are established dynamically. Messages are
routed between a sender and destinations, and any potential intermediate node can be used
opportunistically as the next hop, provided it is likely to bring the message closer to the final
destination. The authors indicate that node mobility plays a crucial role as it permits to bridge
disconnected clouds of nodes, and ultimately enable end-to-end communications despite
connectivity weakness. They envision employing opportunistic networks in the next-generation
Internet.
Another researcher, Alajeely et al. [AlDA16] also define opportunistic networks (“OppNets”)
as an evolution of MANETs, in which many wireless nodes communicate opportunistically with
each other using “store-carry-forward.” A variety of wireless technologies can be used to transfer
data, including IEEE 802.11, WiMAX, and Bluetooth. No end-to-end connection is established
between the source and the destination nodes before sending messages; the nodes usually have
high mobility, low density, limited power, and short radio range. Due to these features, OppNets
face serious security and privacy issues—such as challenges for node authentication and access
control; data confidentiality, integrity, and availability; and routing, security, privacy and trust
management.
Overall, we believe that Opportunistic Resource Utilization Networks (Oppnets)—as defined
earlier [LKBG06, KGLY07]—are significantly different from opportunistic networks—as defined
above by other researchers (e.g., (Pelusi et al. [PePC06]; Conti et al. [CGMP10]; Alajeely et al.
[AlDA16]). Most importantly, oppnets enable not only opportunistic communications but also
opportunistic use of all kinds of resources, services, or capabilities (including hardware, software,
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human skills, etc.) possessed by foreign entities (helpers) that happen to be within the oppnet's
reach. Another distinctive feature differentiates oppnets from other opportunistic networks is that
an oppnet starts as a relatively small pre-defined network called a Seed Oppnet, which grows into
an Expanded Oppnet.

2.2.1.3. Software Defined Networks (SDNs)
Software Defined Networks (SDNs) are a network virtualization paradigm that separates
network software from the underlying hardware. The separation of the control logic from data
forwarders can be realized using a well-defined programming interface between the switches and
the SDN controller. With SDN, network switches become simple forwarding devices and the
control logic is implemented by a centralized controller [KRVR15]. The controller exercises direct
supervision over the states of data forwarding elements via a well-defined application
programming interface (API). An example of such an API is OpenFlow [MABP08]; depending on
the rules installed by a controller on an OpenFlow switch, the switch can be instructed to behave
like a router, switch, firewall, or perform other roles (e.g., be a load balancer, traffic shaper).
We believe that oppnets can take advantage of SDN technology to implement their
middleware, called an Oppnet Virtual Machine (OVM) [AlLi15]. On the other hand, the so-called
primitives used in OVM can benefit the SDN technology (e.g., by developing an SDN analogy to
making entities oppnet-enabled).

2.2.1.4. Self-Organizing Networks (SONs)
Self-Organizing Networks (SONs) are automation technology network systems designed to
provide cost-efficient deployment, operation, and maintenance of mobile network [JPGC14]. SON
was among the requirements within the 3rd Generation Partnership Project (3GPP) Long Term
Evolution (LTE) standardization [UTRA15]. SON functions can be categorized into three major
subfunctions: (i) self-configuration; (ii) self-optimization; and (iii) self-healing. The following
works are some literature on SONs.
Tonguz and Viriyasitavat [ToVi13] propose a biologically inspired self-organizing network
system whereby certain vehicles serve as Road Side Units (RSUs). Vehicles that act as temporary
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RSUs can act as a communication bridge for other networks by making occasional brief stops.
Authors believe that using vehicles as RSUs could improve message reachability and network
connectivity between vehicles while avoiding the cost of deploying RSUs.
Trang [Tran14] proposes Distributed Self-Organizing Network (DISON) which uses a
multilevel management schema to provide scalability for large sensor networks. The platform help
sensor nodes self-adapt to the changes in network resources and application requirements. The
author shows how the platform is used to coordinate network resources among groups of adjacent
sensor nodes.
Placzek [Plac14] introduces a self-organizing traffic signal system for an urban road network.
The main components of this system are agents that control traffic signals at intersections. Agents
detect incoming traffic, make decisions, and execute commands to control traffic at the
intersection. Such commands will determine autonomously which traffic streams will get green
lights. An interval microscopic traffic model is used by the agents to predict and suspend
commands whose effects are uncertain.
Although SON systems share with the oppnet middleware the ability to form, organization,
and management of nodes in the absence of a core center [PrBe05], SON systems are not focused
on the concept of acquiring resources via helpers, which is the core feature of oppnets developed
by the OVM-based oppnet middleware

2.2.1.5. Delay-Tolerant Networks (DTNs)
Delay-Tolerant Networks (DTNs) are a kind of wireless networks which provide connectivity
between regional networks when communication is prone to discontinuation and interruptions. By
adapting store-and-forward message switching, DTN can overcome problems causing large delays
[SeFM07]. The following literature are some works on the DTN-based systems.
Husni and Wibow [HuWi12] build a DTN-based application that includes an email server
capable of sending and receiving emails even if the server is not continuously connected to a
network. The proposed email server exploits DTN’s ability to overcome problems associated with
extreme environments, intermittent connectivity, large or variable delays, and high bit error rates
(which are common characteristics for communications with remote areas). The authors propose
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using facilities and infrastructures such as the Public Transportation System (PTS) for building a
DTN-based network. A train system was chosen to be the infrastructure for DTN routers using
Wi-Fi. A train passing through a village (even not stopping there) can have a mobile Wi-Fi station,
which brings to the village new email from the outside world as well as collects local email
awaiting for sending to the outside world.
Ribeiro et al. [RiPC14] propose the use of DTN to build an underwater monitoring system
with sensors distributed over a subsea infrastructure, which is responsible for operation and
transportation of oil products. Underwater acoustic modems are installed on the sensors to transmit
data. Platforms and vessels used for logistic support of oil exploration collect data and provide
references for positioning the sensors. However, since the vessels may not be within the sensor
range at all times, DTN must be used for supporting communication.
We believe that the main goal for the DTN and its based applications are providing
connectivity in the most challenging networking circumstances. On the other hand, the oppnet
paradigm and its applications can go beyond that to include not only DTN capabilities, but also all
their own distinctive capabilities, starting with earning resources via the philosophy of accepting
new assistants.

2.2.2. Other Concepts Related to Oppnets
In this subsection, we review some other concepts related or similar to oppnets, including (but
not limited to): Internet of Things, software defined network, and network function virtualization.
The key features distinguishing our oppnet paradigm from each of the other concepts (systems and
mechanisms) are identified.

2.2.2.1. Internet of Things (IoT)
Internet of Things (IoT) is now a widely known concept that aims at sharing resources via
heterogeneous devices by minimizing the communication gap between heterogeneous devices
[HeBE12, NiLY13, UBJB12]. To reach this goal, some of the proposed solutions require that the
Original Equipment Manufacturers (OEMs) agree to produce new products capable of interacting
with devices of other OEMs, regardless of their make or model. The idea is that collectively OEMs
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can agree on an open, universal development framework/standard supported by a thriving technical
community and ecosystem.
Other IoT initiatives focus their efforts on developing IoT applications that allow devices to
interact, discover, sense and actuate with minimal human interaction. These applications
communicate through different technologies such as Wi-Fi, Ethernet, or IEEE 802.15.4 radio; they
can form a mesh or utilize the Internet to scale up. The following literature are some of the available
IoT systems that are related to oppnets.
IoT Toolkit [IoTT14] is another open-source project that aims to create a platform for
facilitating interoperability between various protocols and cloud services. It provides consistent
abstractions for different Machine-to-Machine (M2M) communication platforms. It also provides
interoperability between different types of “things” (devices) by developing an API based on
resource models that use common concepts across different “things.” The goal for IoT Toolkit
developers is to construct the Web standards for IoT to broaden its use.
The Thing System [ThTS14] aims to connect smart “things” within a home in order to these
“things” to interact autonomously. At the center of this system is the “steward,” which is software
built as server-side Java scripts. The steward runs on different systems ranging from a laptop to
single-board computers. The Thing System has an adaptive behavior, i.e., it learns that the home
owner likes her coffee at 6 a.m. and she likes to watch the local news channel with the living room
blinds open. The Thing System uses different ways to communicate with the devices: (i) Built-in
support for manufacture-specific protocols to access, e.g., Philips Hue light bulb, Apple TV, and
devices using ZigBee, Z-Wave, etc., (ii) The user can write a “device driver” for her specific
communication protocol for the steward to support it, (iii) It uses Thing Sensor Reporting Protocol
to report sensor readings, (iv) The Simple Thing Protocol is used when a device is able not just to
sense but also to actuate.
The key characteristics clearly distinguishing oppnets from the IoT (well visible in the oppnet
context [Aldu15, AlLi15]) are:
1) Most if not all IoT systems rely on devices that are pre-configured in a deterministic manner.
2) Some IoT platforms do not fully utilize the ability of some devices to discover other devices,
are unable to admit them into their network, are not capable of interacting with them in an ad
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hoc manner, and cannot help each other without the mediation of a directory, a control center,
or another third party.
3) Most of the IoT solutions are designed for home automation (however, with some tweaking
many can lend their capabilities to other applications).
4) Some IoT platforms are limited to using only a certain communication protocol, such as WiFi.
5) Some IoT solutions have a built-in support only for manufacturer-specific protocols. In order
to extend their functionality to devices from other manufacturers, users have to write new
device drivers.
We believe that oppnets can be used to implement IoT systems and applications. IoT systems
can use the OVM-based oppnet middleware (possibly with adjusting them for the specific IoT
needs, considering some differences between oppnets and IoT).

2.2.2.2. Ambient Networks (ANs)
Ambient Networks (ANs) are a networking paradigm that use beyond 3G systems. It was
developed as a part of the European Union sixth framework project [Euro02]. It aims at providing
existing and new services over any access technology and any type of network. To attain such
services, ANs enable on-demand and transparent cooperation between heterogeneous networks,
with little or no pre-configuration or off-line agreement [BeGD08]. The following are some
systems that are developed based on AN. Vodel et al. [VoCH10] present a communication concept
that aims at combining the advantages of different communication technologies (such as cognitive
radios and ANs) by integrating them into an embedded communication platform. The idea behind
the concept is to create a lightweight radio standard that combines the advantages of different
communication technologies while overcoming the disadvantages of a single radio standard with
its design limitations.
We believe that ANs are similar to the oppnet OVM middleware in its ability to integrate
heterogeneous devices to provide the diverse services. But there are two main differences that
distinguish the oppnet middleware from AN systems: (i) AN systems are completely predesigned
and all their facilities are built-in while the operations of the oppnet middleware are mostly ad hoc,
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including self-configuration and self-management, and (ii) AN systems are global networks
intended to replace the Internet, while the oppnet middleware is intended to build local/wide area
networks to serve a wide range of applications [KGLY07].

2.2.2.3. Network Function Virtualization (NFV)
Network Function Virtualization (NFV) is a paradigm that separates software implementation
of network functions from the underlying hardware by leveraging virtualization technologies and
programmable hardware [HGJL15]. Networks using NFV improve the flexibility of network
services by provisioning and reducing the time to market for new services [HGJL15].
NFV opens the door to over-the-top (OTT) services, in which networks may appear
substantially different to their users from their underlying infrastructure [JoBe16]. For example, a
network provider can provide a single global network view with consistent security policies, even
though it does not have a presence in all the countries; it is done by virtualizing local networks and
clouds for those countries. Incorporation of computing and storage resources in the guts of the
network itself enables rethinking what constitutes a network interface, namely going beyond a “bit
pipe”; this results in considering flexible service chains, store-and-forward content distribution
services, network-based Big Data analytics, and sensory data aggregation services [JoBe16].
We believe that solutions outlined in this chapter can be extended to NFVs. As an example,
the idea of oppnet-enabled entities could be used in NFVs

2.3. A Review of Security and Privacy Threats in Oppnets
In this subsection we review the most important security and privacy threats that can be
exploited to harm oppnets. We can broadly classify the oppnet security and privacy threats and
attacks into two main categories, namely outsider and insider attacks, as defined below (depending
on their origin/source in oppnets):
Outsider attacks. These are external attacks carried out by unauthorized nodes which are not a
part of the oppnets yet. Examples are candidate helper nodes that do not belong to the domain of
oppnet but penetrate the oppnet area to launch its attack. In the outsider attacks, an adversary aims,
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e.g., to cause congestion of the network by propagating fake routing information or disrupting
normal network functioning by disturbing nodes from providing services.
Insider attacks. These are internal attacks caused by authorized nodes that are part of the oppnet
(including, for example, some malicious candidate helpers or some actual helpers). These attacks
have a severe effect on oppnet since malicious nodes are already part of the network. Thus, they
can access oppnet’s resources. The reason for their malicious behavior may be as follows:
a) Hijacking these insider nodes by some outsider attacker and then using them for launching
insider attacks in the network.
b) Selfishness to gain fair share of the limited oppnet resources (such as battery power, processing
capabilities, or the communication bandwidth) and exploiting other nodes.

2.3.1. Security Threats and Attacks in Oppnets
This subsection presents some of the most dangerous security threats and attacks on oppnets.
These threats and attacks, presented in the alphabetical order, are as follows:
1) Authentication and Authorization Bypass [ForJ17]: An authentication bypass vulnerability
exists in an application if there is a way to authenticate the application without providing
authentic credentials. An authorization bypass attack occurs when an attacker gains
unauthorized access to application resources (which may be unauthenticated). This dangerous
threat allows helpers to masquerade as oppnet members. Such helper nodes can then attack its
oppnet not only individually but can form a gang for attacking their oppnets [LKBG06].
2) Blackhole attack: In a blackhole attack, a malicious node silently drops or discards all packets
passing through it by not forwarding them to the particular destination node. Because of the
dropped packets, the amount of the needed retransmission increases, causing congestion
[CYCW10]. Malicious nodes can advertise themselves as having a valid route to a destination
node on the network, even though the route is spurious, with the intention to intercept packets
[AlDA16]. For example, in oppnets, an attacker can absorb intercepted help request messages
without forwarding them to a rescue team, defeating the main purposes of an emergency
oppnet.
3) Denial of Service (DoS): It is an attack designed to shut down an application or network,
making it unavailable to its intended users (e.g., disrupting a particular machine or network
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and denying legitimate users access to their services). When a DoS comes from many points,
as in the case of a distributed-denial-of-service (DDoS) attack, the defense is more difficult.
There are two general methods of DoS attacks: flooding or crashing [PfPM15, ForJ17].
Flooding attacks occur when an attacker exhausts network's resources (such as a bandwidth,
battery power, etc.), causing the network performance to gradually slow down and eventually
stop. crashing attacks exploit vulnerabilities that cause the target system or network services
to crash (abruptly not gradually) [JGAD10]. Oppnets are subject to various DoS attacks from
the physical layer to application layer. For example, DoS attacks may target weak insiders in
an oppnet by generating fake help request messages, which will keep the rescue team busy and
unavailable for real emergencies [LKBG06].
4) Gray hole attack: In this attack a malicious node can switch from behaving properly to
behaving maliciously as a black hole. A gray hole may exhibit its malicious behavior in two
different ways. First, an attacker may drop packets coming from specific node(s) in the network
while forwarding all the packets for other nodes. Second, an attacker may behave maliciously
for a while by dropping all packets, then return to a benevolent behavior [ChGa11, ShAn12,
KaJK15]. As a result, such attack is more difficult to detect than the blackhole attack.
5) ID Spoofing: It is a situation in which one node or program masquerades successfully as
another node by falsifying data and thereby gaining an illegitimate advantage. We believe that
ID spoofing may occur in oppnets, when an adversary attempts to impersonate a helper's ID in
order to gain its privileges or use of its resources. For instance, a masquerading malicious
device can generate fake help requests with multiple IDs, producing many false alarms for the
rescue team. Services that need authentication can be misused if IDs can be spoofed. A device
capable of spoofing ID of a trusted node or a node with critical functions can lanch many kinds
of attacks [LKBG06].
6) Malware (a.k.a. malicious code injection): It is malicious code/software specifically designed
by attackers to damage data, hosts, or networks [MahZ16]. Therefore, attacks using malware
are known as malicious code injection (and can attack both operating systems and user
applications). Malware may include viruses, worms, spam, spywares, or Trojan horses
[MiBo14, FWKM15]. Malware can spread quickly, also in oppnet applications. For instance,
an adversary can inject malicious code into a legitimate helper to gain control over it (which
might result even in an overall shutdown of the oppnet application).
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7) Man-in-the-Middle (MITM): In this threat, the malicious entity takes over the control of
communications between two hosts (nodes), becoming an illegitimate and covert “mediator”
[FWKM15]. The MITM attacker violates at least confidentiality of the intercepted messages
but can also violate the integrity of the intercepted message (since these messages can be
modified in arbitrary ways, including injection of false or confusing information). MITM may
occur also in oppnets. For example, when a victim sends a help request message to the rescuers,
an MITM attack can maliciously alter or tamper with the messages [LKBG06].
8) Remote code execution: It is a catchall term for any vulnerability or threat that allows an
attacker to run an arbitrary code in the context of an application. This can occur through
hijacking the logic of the application or influencing the command line of sub-processes created
during normal operation [ForJ17]. Remote code execution vulnerabilities pose a critical
security threat in oppnet applications because they allow an attacker to compromise the system
via the application.
9) Sniffing attack: The idea of this attack is that an attacker can launch an attack on the system by
inserting a sniffer application into the system; the sniffer can then gain network information,
which can be used to penetrate and corrupt the system [FWKM15]. Sniffing attacks may take
place in oppnets, e.g., when an outsider attacker intercepts communications among oppnet
nodes. The attacker can then, e.g., falsify oppnet messages to redirect them to parties other
than the original addressees (such as the rescuers) [AlAL17].
10) Sybil attack: In this attack, a malicious node sends many messages, each with a different fake
ID. For example, a Sybil attack could derail a voting system. When an attacker uses 100 fake
IDs to give 100 votes (instead of a single legitimate vote that it is illegitimate to give). In
general, in this kind of attack, a malicious device pretends being a larger number of nodes by
generating an arbitrary number of additional IDs while using only one physical device
[NSSP04]. This may happen in the oppnets when a malicious node impersonates some nonexistent nodes, which will appear as several nodes conspiring together, to defraud other oppnet
nodes.
11) Wormhole attack: The idea of this attack is that an attacker records packets at one location in
a network and tunnels them (possibly selectively) via its out-of-band3 connection to another

3

Out-of-band connection is a connection (a "tunnel") is not a part of the original network (and thus not available to
regular network users) but available to the attackers executing a wormhole attack.
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location in the network. The tunnel between two locations is referred as a wormhole [HuPJ06].
During a wormhole attack in oppnets an attacker claims a shortest path in the network to a
particular destination in order to attract traffic, which will be tunneled to the opposite end of
the wormhole.

2.3.2. Data Privacy Threats and Attacks in Oppnets
Oppnet data messages can be temporarily stored or instantly forwarded among the intermediate
oppnet nodes, until they reach the destination node. Oppnet data can be subject to manipulation or
disclosure due to a variety of the insider/outsider attacks.
The most serious privacy threats and attacks on oppnet data can be summarized (in the
alphabetical order) as follows:
1) Camouflage: This threat may occur when a malicious node hides itself and masquerades as a
normal node in a computing system, which can result in compromising the system [VSCH14].
For example, a camouflaged oppnet node may start advertising false routing information to
other nodes in the network in order to attract traffic from them possibly to perform a gray hole
attack. Intercepted packets can be analyzed for extracting private information.
2) Confidentiality disclosure: This threat can lead to unauthorized disclosure and dissemination
of sensitive data [BeLi09]. Data in oppnets, sent from a source node to a destination node, goes
through many intermediate nodes (including helpers) for forwarding. For this reason, oppnet
data are vulnerable to copying by an intermediate node, and thus revealing their sensitive data
content, violating data confidentiality.
3) Eavesdropping: It is a threat that an unauthorized entity listens to information sent among
oppnet nodes privacy [VSCH14]. One of the results of materialization of this threat is
communication tracking, which reveals identities of communicating oppnet nodes [AlAL17].
In general, it results in disclosing some private oppnet information that should be kept
confidential.
4) Information disclosure (a.k.a. personal data disclosure): This vulnerability exists if there is a
way to get an application to “steal” information it was not originally designed to provide, such
as a content of memory, a file path, authentication credentials, etc. Such information might
then be used by an attacker to aid him in further exploitation [ForJ17]. Therefore, personal data
31

disclosures are illegitimate and dangerous [AlAL17]. Sensitive oppnet information can be
exposed by either outsider attackers (including potential or candidate helpers) or by insider
attackers (actual or admitted helpers).
5) Localization and tracking: This threat results in an illegitimate disclosure of a location of an
individual or a device through diverse means, e.g., GPS data, Internet, or smartphone
triangulation, etc. [ZiMW14, AlAL17]. In oppnet applications, each oppnet node has a unique
identifier. When an oppnet application is not protected and a specific device (e.g., helper) is
associated with a particular identifier, tracking of this device becomes possible.
6) Traffic analysis: It is the process of intercepting and examining data flow in an oppnet in order
to extract sensitive information, including network routing and flow patterns (such as a source,
destination, and source-destination pair) [VSCH14]. In particular, malicious nodes can identify
the most active oppnet nodes, and make them targets of subsequent privacy attacks (assuming
that the most active nodes — e.g., Control Center nodes — are also most important or most
knowledgeable) [AlAL17].
7) Unauthorized access: Since the main purpose of an oppnet is to opportunistically exploit
available resources, it needs to be expanded by admitting helpers (with diverse resources) to
achieve a desired oppnet goal. Thus, any unauthorized access to oppnet data by those helpers
is a privacy violation [AlAL17].

2.4. A Review of Security and Privacy Controls for Oppnets
In this subsection, we review some previous security and privacy oppnet research solutions
and mechanisms that can be used in the proposed system.

2.4.1. Previous Security and Privacy Oppnet Controls
In this subsection, we present the work that investigates previous security and privacy solutions
for oppnets. Since oppnets are a new technology; researchers focused on improving their main
structure and operations, as well as proving the concept. Thus, research work on security and
privacy in oppnets is very limited.
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Lilien et al. [LKBG06] present a general security scheme for oppnets. The proposed general
security scheme for oppnets includes five mandatory steps (in the absence of initial authentication
mechanism): (a) robust routing (to prevent common attacks); (b) granting access to helpers based
on their roles; (c) authorizing helpers to perform certain operations; (d) observing helpers’
behavior; and (e) using special intrusion detection techniques for sophisticated attacks by helpers.
The result from the last two steps (step (d) and (e)) can help to find “bad guys,” and then
permanently eliminate, isolate, and avoid these bad guys during routing so that they can’t join.
Lilien et al. [LiKG06] identify ways of managing oppnets, including control of privacy and
security problems in oppnets as an important challenge that should be addressed. They mentioned
that management algorithms for controlling oppnet nodes are needed, including required
algorithms and methods for identifying inefficient or suspicious members of an oppnet (malicious
oppnet-enabled entities), and reject (or isolate) them if necessary. Even members of the original
seed oppnets can be rejected, if they become a threat within the oppnet. We believe that these
algorithms and methods need to be clearly defined and implemented in line with oppnet
applications. This is what we are looking for to achieve in this work
Lilien et al. [LKBG07] present some suggested solutions to preserve the privacy of mutual
relationships between oppnets and its helpers. Because they believe strongly that there is no
underlying reason behind an oppnet would need to enslave the device asked to help it, exploiting
its sensitive resources. There is also no inherent reason why the helper device would need to reveal
all such resources to the oppnets. As one example of a suggested solution, the candidate helper can
keep its private data in a secure vault (e.g., enciphered in its storage) before agreeing to join an
oppnet that asks for help. In case of an involuntary conscription (in an emergency situation), the
oppnet will allow the candidate helper to save private data in helper’s own vault before mustering
it.
Another example of a solution [LKBG07] is relying on a strict separation of private and public
areas within the helper device or network. This will ensure that a benevolent oppnet will never
(even when it malfunctions) attempt to capture helper’s private data. It will also provide protection
against malevolent oppnets that might attack privacy of other devices or networks acting as helpers
with legitimate requests. We believe that to achieve (or apply) these suggested solutions, they need
to be provided by required algorithms and necessary methods to protect oppnets against all kinds
of security and privacy attacks.
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2.4.2. Security and Privacy Mechanisms for the Proposed Solution
This subsection includes reviewing the current mechanisms that can be used in the proposed
system.

2.4.2.1. Pervasive Trust Foundation for Security and Privacy
Bhargava et al. [BhLi04] introduced the concept of pervasive trust. They recognize that using
trust in computing systems is already common. Trust is and should be pervasive in many
interactions between people, organizations, animals, and even artifacts. Hence, pervasive trust
should also be considered in computing environments. The authors argue that trust can support
security and privacy, facilitating solutions.
Lilien et al. [LiAB09, LiAB10] propose the Pervasive Trust Foundation (PTF) paradigm for
next generation networks, including the Future Internet. They claim that trust can also be used to
support many other functions, e.g., for routing, data aggregation, time synchronization, and even
stimulating cooperation in autonomous wireless networks. The authors claim that: (i) security
without trust (not based on trust) is more difficult to achieve than security with trust (based on
trust); (ii) confusing narrowly defined trust with broadly defined trust leads to denying the need
for a pervasive trust foundation; (iii) ignoring trust leads to high risks; (iv) trust can be used
implicitly only after making a conscious decision that there is a sufficient trust level; (v) using
broadly defined trust is necessary for comprehensive and consistent consideration of trust by any
security service serving any network layer.
To the best of our knowledge, this is first attempted for utilizing PTF to provide a
comprehensive security solution for oppnets or more limited opportunistic networks.

2.4.2.2. Active Data Bundles for Protecting Sensitive Data
Many researchers investigate using active data bundles (ADBs) as a mechanism for protecting
sensitive data in diverse systems, including IoT, healthcare information systems, VANETs, clouds,
and fogs. To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to explore the applications of ADBs for
oppnets.
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Ben Othmane and Lilien [BeLi08, BeLi09] propose ADB (called an “active bundle”) for
protecting sensitive data from their disclosure to unauthorized parties and from unauthorized
dissemination (even if started by an authorized party). The ADB solution protects private or
sensitive data throughout their entire lifecycle, from creation through dissemination to partial or
total destruction. It is a software construct that encapsulates sensitive data (to be protected) with
metadata and a virtual machine that controls data and metadata. Metadata includes, among others,
policies to be enforced. The virtual machine (VM) enforces policies specified in metadata via data
protection operations—including apoptosis and evaporation. Apoptosis is the process of a
complete self-destruction of an ADB, which occurs when its VM realizes that privacy of the
ADB’s sensitive data is about to be compromised by a visited host. Evaporation is the process of
destroying this part of ADB data or metadata that the host is not allowed to access.
Salih and Lilien [SaLi11] propose using ADB to provide protection for the patients' Electronic
Medical Records (EMR) during entire EMR lifetime, including its dissemination among different
healthcare provider locations. First, the EMR owners, using Abs, do not have to isolate EMRs or
avoid sharing them because ABs prevent unauthorized EMR accesses by visited hosts with
insufficient trust levels. Second, ABs provide tools protecting owners’ (or guardians’) privacy
rights for arbitrary EMR fragments (down to the single record level). Third, ADB protects a
patient’s EMR even if the EMR is owned by different owners with privacy policies of differing
strength. Even if an attacker tries to exploit the laxness of some owners’ privacy policies, he still
faces the ADB’s VM that enforces the required level of privacy via ADB’s privacy policies.
Sarhan and Lilien [SaLi14] propose a solution for identify management in cloud based on the
ADB scheme. While the typical ADB implementation relies on a centralized trusted third party
(TTP) server, using a centralized TTP increases the risks of many attacks, including side channel
and correlation attacks. Therefore, their solution called ADBMPC, which stands for active data
bundles with multiparty computation. It eliminates the problem posed by centralized TTPs relying
on several other leading-edge technologies. They include multi-agent systems (MAS), attributebased encryption (ABE), multiparty computation (MPC), threshold cryptography, Shamir's
threshold secret sharing, and the BGW protocol (to jointly compute a chosen function).
Al-Hasnawi et al. [AlAL16] propose a solution for protecting sensitive data in IoT by enforcing
data owners’ privacy policies based on using ADBs. The ADB scheme empowers data owners to
enforce their privacy policies on their sensitive data throughout the entire lifecycle of the data.
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This explicitly addresses the issue of the lack of control over data that leaves its source. With the
ADB scheme, “raw” or “passive” data are not available for anything or anybody; instead, data can
be accessed only after the policy-enforcing VM “filters” them through all privacy policies. There
are two main goals of using ADBs in the IoT: protecting subjects’ sensitive data from unauthorized
disclosures, and limiting access to subjects’ sensitive data by authorized parties only to data
satisfying the need-to-know principle. They outline the ADB lifecycle in IoT by describing the
process of ADB creation, dissemination, and enabling with respect to the IoT data flow stages.
When an IoT host receives the ADB, the VM controls the execution of the ADB (by utilizing the
host’s hardware and operating system) to enforce privacy policies that fully control disclosure of
ADB data to the host.
Hosseinpour et al. [HoPT16] present a new approach for big data management in IoT. It relies
on the concept of smart data which is inspired by ADB. The smart data has a similar structure to
the ADB. It is an intelligent unit which can evolve and participate in the operation of an IoT
application. A basic and lightweight version of smart data is generated by IoT sensors. It evolves
(grows) when it travels through the network towards the cloud, merging with other cells. The
process is the opposite when data moves from the cloud towards the actuators. The smart data
concept focuses on reducing computational and network overheads resulted from handling big data
in IoT rather than protecting these data which is our approach. We believe that virtual machine in
any ADB can be smart and more intelligent. In another word, the smart data that is called (used)
in their paper can be equal to the ADB.
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first attempt to utilize ADBs for providing
a comprehensive data privacy and security solution for oppnets or opportunistic networks.
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CHAPTER 3

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

3.1. Introduction
This chapter is essential for most scientific research. It includes a brief description of the
general means through which the goals of the study will be achieved: methods, procedures, tasks,
steps, etc. In this chapter, we start by defining research methodology and giving an overview of
the research process and its steps, and then describing the design of the research tools that can be
used for simulating and running experiments for our solution.

3.2. Definition of Research Methodology
Research methodology is defined by the Oxford English Dictionary (OED) [Stan14] as:
"The branch of knowledge that deals with method generally or with the
methods of a particular discipline or field of study; a treatise or dissertation on
method; the study of the direction and implications of empirical research, or of
the suitability of the techniques employed in it; (more generally) a method or
body of methods used in a particular field of study or activity."
This definition indicates that methodology does not define a direct solution for a specific
research problem. Further, research methodology is not related to a specific method; instead, it
offers the theoretical foundation for understanding which methods could be applied to the specific
research area. In other words, research methodology refers to a systematic way to solve a problem
based on theoretical analysis of the methods applied to a field of study.
Therefore, research methodology is a guide on how to prepare research and why we choose or
adapt specific methods and tools for our research. Our research aims to achieve two objectives,
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protecting interaction security and data privacy in oppnets. To address these objectives, we have
investigated several methods in order to achieve it. Eventually, we use Pervasive Trust Foundation
(PTF) to assure security of interactions among oppnet entities, as well as utilize the Active Data
Bundle (ADB) scheme to protect privacy of data in oppnets. Our research methodology that used
this Dissertation is explained in more detail (in the form of detailed steps) in the next section

3.3. Research Process
This section describes the main steps that researchers must cover when preparing their research
methodology. It consists of a series of steps or stages that are necessary to perform the research
effectively. The main eight-steps in our research process are illustrated in Fig. 3.1 (cf. [Koth04]).
1) Determine Research Area: Since oppnets depend primarily on dividing tasks and data among
oppnet entities (including seed nodes, helpers and even candidate helpers), data in oppnets are
likely to be exposed to a wide spectrum of attacks. These attacks and threats can jeopardize
security, privacy and integrity of data during their entire lifecycle, especially if the current
oppnet is not protected. We can consider what has been mentioned above, the area of research
that needs to be addressed
2) Perform Literature Review: At this step, the researcher should perform comprehensive
literature review related to the problem. For this purpose, we do a review of the concepts and
theories related to the field of study (e.g., oppnets) on the one hand, and review previous
research findings on the other hand. Therefore, it is considered the cornerstone that gives us an
overview of what the earlier studies have done, and what we can contribute to this research
area. In our research, the literature review involves threats and attacks that undermine the
security and privacy of oppnets. Also, what are the potential techniques and controls that can
address these threats and vulnerabilities of oppnet and its sensitive data. At the end of this step,
the first place to go is to define a research problem and then formulate research hypotheses, as
we described in the next steps.
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Figure 3.1. The eight-step waterfall model of a research process (cf. [Koth04]).
3) Define Research Problem: Depending on the previous steps, we can determine that there are
two kinds of attackers in oppnets. The first attacker is an insider attacker who is malicious
helpers; and the other is an outsider attacker including malicious candidate helpers, which may
effectively disrupt the oppnet's operation, or maliciously reveal or destroy sensitive oppnet
data. In this step, we clearly defined the research problem that needs to be addressed during
the next step of the research process.
4) Formulate Research Hypotheses: Ryan et al. [RyST92] stated that, “When the research
problem has been identified, the problem is generally analysed by formulating a hypothesis. A
hypothesis may be regarded as a statement of the empirical relationship between a set of
variables. In general, this type of hypothesis is referred to as a scientific hypothesis." So, it can
be stated that the research hypothesis is what the researchers expect the relationship between
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two or more variables, but it involves more than just a guess. The visions, concepts and
suggestions are the basis of a research hypothesis. In other words, a hypothesis is a proposition
that can be put to a test to determine its validity in research. Therefore, we formulate our
research hypothesis based on adoption Pervasive the Trust Foundation (PTF) and the Active
Data Bundle (ADB) as the most important components of the proposed solution. In our view,
the proposition that PTF is a basis for assuring secure interactions among oppnet entities, and
ADB is the protecting scheme for sensitive data in oppnets.
5) Design Proposed Solution: This step is one of the most critical steps of the research process,
which refers to the theoretical structure in which the research is conducted (design a method
to do the research). It can be considered as a summary of previous steps and a basis for the
next steps of the research process. So, the design proposed solution can be clearly defined as a
plan, structure and strategy of research to find out alternative tools to solve the problems and
to reduce the expenditure of effort and time. In our proposed solution, we determine a design
of PTF-based Oppnet Architecture (POA) for secure interactions and design ADB-based
Oppnet Scheme (AOS) for protecting sensitive data. Then, we integrate POA with AOS to
design a high-level architecture for a Secure Privacy-Preserving Oppnet (SP2O) as a proposed
solution. furthermore, we define the basic operations for all proposed architectures in this step.
6) Evaluate Effectiveness and Efficiency of the Solution: This step is concerned with collecting
data that are appropriate for research, in some humanitarian research it is called collect data
[Koth04]. There are several ways of collecting the appropriate data which differ from one
researcher to another and depends mainly on the quality of the research and available resources.
In our research, we perform a comprehensive simulation and carry out necessary experiments
for both the baseline system and the proposed system to obtain the required data (results). To
describe the proposed solution in a more realistic and interesting way, we discuss developed
proof-of-concept scenario (healthcare scenario) (The value of scenarios in academic research
produces interesting research [RMVK15]).
7) Analyze Results of Research: After collecting required results achieved in the previous step,
the researcher turns to do a comprehensive intellectual analysis of the results. The process of
analysis of the results is generally included as classification and tabulation of results. Also,
computation of various percentages, coefficients, etc., is done by applying various well defined
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statistical formulae. In our research, we evaluated our results by designing and executing two
simulation experiments, one for the baseline system and another for the proposed system. The
criteria and measures for the desired efficiency is evaluated by a comprehensive comparison
of the results obtained for each simulation experiment in the baseline system and the proposed
system (SP2O). In both simulation experiments, we used the same scenario (as discussed in
more detail in Chapter 5) in order to make the comparison between the results obtained more
logical.
8) Prepare Research Report: This is the final step of the research process including the
oral/graphical representation based on a written document that communicates the purpose,
scope,

limitations,

objectives,

hypothesis,

methodology,

findings

and

eventual

recommendations ultimately to other researchers. In this step, we write the final report or the
documentation of the Ph.D. Dissertation with great care that meets the standards of a good
scientific research [Koth04].
Finally, note that Steps 1 to 5 have been completed during the proposal research. Proposal
writing is not shown in the Fig. 3.1 (only the scope of the proposal research is shown). Also, the
feedbacks (the small iteration loops) illustrated in Fig. 3.1 may help to improve and develop all
the previous steps to fit with the hypothesis formulated earlier in our research area. In addition,
writing this Dissertation could not be done without the help and support from other resources such
as attending workshops for graduate students provided by the Graduate College at WMU,
following WMU guidelines for writing a Ph.D. dissertation, and reading some books and papers
for writing a dissertation [Koth04, ElLe09, MaGa15, RMVK15].

3.4. Research Tools
In this section, we present the research tools used in the Dissertation. First of all, we used the
modular MicroOppnet v.5 (with the third generation of OVM primitives) as the baseline system
that should be compared with our proposed system in this Dissertation. So, we first recreated the
modular MicroOppnet v.5 (using same software-simulation tools, and new hardware) and run it
for its original healthcare scenario [AlLi15] to study deeply and observe the functionality of oppnet
operations (cf. [Aldu15]). The original healthcare scenario used as the latest proofs of concept for
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the MicroOppnet v.5 (excluding security and privacy considerations4) was simulated by Alduailij
[Aldu15] using the Eclipse (Kepler) Integrated Development Environment (IDE), Java v.6 (not
later versions), and the simulation package SimJava2 [SiJa15].
We intended to use the same simulation tools (Java v.6 and the simulation package SimJava2
for our proposed system) to save time and effort, but the limitations of the simulation package
(library) SimJava2 prevented our contribution from being implemented in such a way. Hence, we
used C# programming language (from Microsoft Visual Studio 2017 [ECMA17]) to re-implement
the simulation of MicroOppnet v.5.2 which is our baseline system. It is also used to simulate our
proposed SP2O system (which adds security and privacy features that were not provided in the
MicroOppnet v.5 system and the third generation OVM primitives). Finally, it is worth mentioning
here we used simulation tools rather than implementation and emulation tools because using the
latter exceeds our time and scale limitations.

3.5. Chapter Conclusions
This chapter discussed our dissertation research methodologies used for this Dissertation. It
includes the definition of research methodology, the main steps in our research process, and the
research tools used in the Dissertation.

4

The authors [AlLi15, Aldu15] designed and implemented the third-generation of OVM primitives were concentrating
on feasibility of OVM and its analysis and validation [Aldu15]. Additionally, they also were fully aware of the
necessity of providing security and privacy in the successive implementations, and indicated it as a necessary
condition for making Oppnets practically useful.
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CHAPTER 4

DESIGN OF THE BASELINE SYSTEM

4.1. Introduction
This chapter start s with a brief description of the baseline system. We consider MicroOppnet
v.5.2 as our baseline system. It is a new version of MicroOppnet v.5 introduced in Section 1.3.
MicroOppnet v.5.2 includes all functionality and features of MicroOppnet v.5 but extends it. Then,
we present in more detail the architecture of the baseline system, including the helper lifecycle
state diagram, updated third-generation OVM primitives, a modified oppnet structure and
operations. Finally, challenges and limitations of the baseline system are presented.

4.2. Description of the Baseline System
MicroOppnet versions—including MicroOppnet v.2.2., MicroOppnet v.4, and MicroOppnet
v.5—were introduced in Section 1.3. We improve MicroOppnet v.5 and consider this extension,
MicroOppnet v.5.2, as our baseline system. This subsection describes MicroOppnet v.5.2 in the
required detail.

4.2.1. Justification and Motivation
Today, most researchers and developers use modular construction (function, method, etc.) in
the object-oriented programming languages to solve large problems in complex systems.
Alduailij [Aldu15] employed object-oriented programming languages (and techniques) by
using modularity features in representing the third generation OVM primitives (MicroOppnet v.5),
while the previous OVM primitives generations (MicroOppnet v.2.2 and MicroOppnet v.4) were
not. This is because of that the first and second-generation OVM primitives (MicroOppnet v.2.2
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and MicroOppnet v.4) were relying on the sequential nature of its OVM primitives, which fit with
the procedural (structured) programming languages5, and does not fit with object-oriented
languages (even although the list of OVM primitives was already constructed).
As the result, the third generation OVM including an improved set of OVM primitives
introduced in order to adapt with the object-oriented languages, making it more completeness,
effectiveness, efficiency, and scalability. This is the main motivation that led us to adopt the
developed version of the third generation OVM primitives—proposed by Alduailij [Aldu15,
Aldu15] and developed by us (will be presented in Subsection 1.4.3)—as a developed set of OVM
primitives can be used in the design of the baseline system (MicroOppnet v.5.2).

4.2.2. Requirements and Features
The most important design requirements for the third generation OVM are listed as follows
(cf. [Aldu15]):
1) The OVM-based middleware consists of a set of OVM primitives that can be downloaded onto
any non-oppnet entity (or device) to make it oppnet-enabled entity. This OVM-based
middleware can support the following required oppnet characteristics, which are distinguish
oppnets from other opportunistic networks:
a) Support for the helper paradigm—as the basis for resource acquisition;
b) Universality—regardless of the entity make or function, and through any communication
medium, protocol, etc.;
c) No third-party mediators—since interactions among oppnet-enabled entities take place
without third parties;
d) Ad hoc operation—except predesigned formation of the seed oppnet.

5

Procedural programming language is a kind of computer programming languages, derived from structured
programming, based upon the concept of the procedure call. Procedures (a.k.a routines, subroutines, or functions)
simply contain a series of well-structured steps to be carried out within its programming context to compose a
program. Examples these languages include Fortran, COBOL, BASIC, Pascal and C, which have been around since
the 1960s and 80s of the last century.
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2) Any two oppnet-enabled entities (OVM components) can interact with each other in an ad hoc
manner to provide necessary resources (if they have a common communication channel within
the reach).
3) The OVM supports extremely heterogeneous entities. Different entities (devices) can accept
different subsets of the OVM primitives depending on their capacity and need.
4) The OVM is composed of a minimum number of OVM primitives because these primitives
are designed in a non-overlapping and non-recurring manner as much as possible (as explained
in Section 4.3).
5) The OVM is enhanced by including an improved set of OVM primitives that adapt to the
object-oriented design principles; resulting in enhancing reusability, extensibility, and
readability.
The most important features of object-oriented design principles applied to the third generation
of OVM primitives (cf. [Aldu15]) are:
1) Modularity (a.k.a. Encapsulation Enforces Modularity): The nature of OVM primitives lends
itself to modularity as the primitives are designed with a high level of atomicity to serve as
building blocks for wide-range of oppnet applications. Therefore, this feature makes the OVM
design easier to manage because the implementation of each OVM Primitive is hidden behind
well-defined boundaries. There are four dimensions of modularity in the design of OVM
primitives: (i) oppnet node category; (ii) heterogeneous types of oppnet devices; (iii) different
communication channels; (iv) Multifunctionality.
2) Inheritance: The set of the third generation OVM primitives is designed to incorporate the
inheritance design pattern which refers to the hierarchical arrangement to perform OVM
primitives. For instance, we can design a Node class as the main class, which includes all types
of oppnet nodes (e.g., the Node class can be extended to seed, potential helper, candidate
helper, helper). Each one of those subclasses is extended to a device type that fits the
specification of that subclass, as will be described in next chapter.
3) Polymorphism: It refers to the ability to redefine methods for derived classes that is already
declared in its superclass under the same name (e.g., oppnet-enabled entities are implemented
in multiple ways). For example, suppose an OVM primitive is possessed by the parent class
45

(superclass) Node and all its children and grandchildren, e.g., seed, helper. However, each one
of the subclasses implements the same method differently.

4.2.3. Oppnet Node, Message, and Task Specifications
This subsection presents the general specifications used to represent the baseline system, which
include oppnet nodes, messages exchanged between oppnet nodes, and the oppnet tasks.

4.2.3.1. Node Specifications
The OVM primitives can be downloaded on any non-oppnet entity (or device) to make it
oppnet-enabled. This means that during the design and implementation of the OVM primitives,
the specifications of the oppnet-enabled entities must be considered. Since the object-oriented
programming features that applied to OVM primitives, it allows us for extension to various devices
by extending each node type to the desired device and overriding the node type methods to agree
with the specifications of the new device. In general, types of devices that are particularly used in
our scenario can be determined in the next chapter (Chapter 5).

4.2.3.2. Message Specifications
This subsection describes the two main types of messages exchanged between the oppnet nodes
in our baseline system (MicroOppnet v.5.2) and our scenario presented in the next chapter.
Oppnet Control Messages (OCMs). OCMs in MicroOppnet v.5.2 are text messages exchanged
between the oppnet nodes, which trigger (motivate) an action in the receiving node. The oppnet
control messages can be described as follows (but not limited to):
1) Help Request: a text message created by the inviting node and sent to candidate helper(s) to
request help for oppnet.
2) Invitation Acceptance: a text message created by the candidate helper and sent to the inviting
node to accept invitation to oppnet nodes.
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3) Admittance Notification: a text message created by the inviting node and sent to candidate
helper(s) that passed the evaluation for admittance into oppnet and now admitted into oppnet.
4) Release Request: is a text message created by the admitted helper and sent to the inviting node
to request release from oppnet work. An oppnet allows a helper to resign only after getting
permission from its inviting node (parent). This permission allows no unilateral quitting by a
helper before it completes its assigned job.
5) Release Notification: a text message created by the inviting node and sent to its admitted
helper(s) (children), to release the child from oppnet.
Oppnet Data Messages (ODMs). ODMs are required messages that contain data help objects
created initially by the CC node (DOC) and sent from each inviting node (parent) to its admitted
helpers (direct children).
Before the further discussion, we need to define a help object, which provides information about
a person who needs assistance. A help object is composed of the following:
a) A help text message: it indicates who needs an urgent assistance and contact information.
b) The person’s profile: it contains personal information including: current person’s location,
name, age, weight, etc. and person’s recent vitals such as temperature, blood pressure,
allergies, etc.
The two main types of oppnet data messages for our baseline system (MicroOppnet v.5.2) are (but
not limited to):
1) Help ODMs: messages that contains a help object. The help object message is an object created
by the seed/CC nodes and passed from each inviting node to all its direct children.
2) Task ODMs: messages containing the list of oppnet tasks created and done by the seed/CC
nodes and passed from each inviting node to all its direct children. For example, one of these
tasks is send/forward/read the help object.

4.2.3.3. Task Specifications
In general, the MicroOppnet v.5.2 tasks include sending, forwarding, or reading (process)
messages. In particular, messages can come from the inviting node (parent) and be passed it to all
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its direct children. The exception are the seed/CC nodes responsible for creating a help object
(which containing help text message and person profile) and passing it to its direct children nodes.
Most of these task messages are stored locally in main memory until they must send them to a
remote regular/lite helper (e.g., Tablet, Printer, etc. as will be explained in more detail in the
scenario in Chapter 5).

4.3. Architecture of the Baseline System
This section presents an architecture of the baseline system including: the helper lifecycle state
diagram, updated third-generation OVM primitives, oppnet structure, as well as basic oppnet
operations using a single helper and multiple helpers.

4.3.1. Helper Lifecycle State Diagram for the Baseline System
This section recalls the basic oppnet architecture that includes structure and operations as
explained in Chapter One. Here, we present a lifecycle state diagram for single helper in the
baseline system. This state diagram is composed of 5 states and 8 transitions between these states,
as shown in Fig. 4.1.
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Figure 4.1. The state diagram for a single oppnet helper.
A single-helper lifecycle begins when a seed needs to grow by scanning and discovering a new
potential helper to assist an oppnet in its job. The five states of a single helper, identified in the
state diagram, are as follows:
State A: Potential Helper—the potential helper is in the initial state (State A) of its lifecycle. The
“Scan & Discover” transition corresponds to identifying the subset of potential helpers, named
Discovered Helper.
State B: Discovered Helper—a discovered helper in this state can be invited (or ordered in some
situations) by oppnet, and then become a Candidate Helper. A Discovered Helper not invited to
join the oppnet changes its state to Potential Helper6 (in other words, it is returned to its original
State A— becoming a member of the pool of potential helpers).

6

Broken arrows (transitions) in Fig 4.1 indicate that the current state returns to the initial state (State A). Solid arrows
indicate that the current state proceeds to the next lifecycle state.
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State C: Candidate Helper—the Candidate Helper is free either to accept or reject the invitation
request relying on its capabilities and resources. In the case of acceptance, it means that the
Candidate Helper becomes an Admitted Helper, committed to performing tasks to be given to it by
the oppnet (as long as the oppnet needs it). In the case when Candidate Helper rejects the invitation
request (e.g., the Candidate Helper is too busy to help), it returns to its initial state again (State A).
State D: Admitted Helper—a Candidate Helper who accepted a help request from the oppnet,
become Admitted Helper.
State E: Integrated Helper—an Admitted Helper can be integrated helper by the oppnet, and have
tasks assigned to it. By completing these tasks, an Integrated Helper contributes to the completion
of the oppnet work.
State F: Potential Helper (again)—an Integrated Helper that completed its tasks is released by the
oppnet, changing its state to the Potential Helper (again). In some cases, when the Integrated
Helper completed its tasks but might be useful for performing other tasks for the oppnet, it returns
to the Admitted Helper pool.

4.3.2. Updated Third-generation OVM Primitives for the Baseline
System
Lilien et al. [LGKY10] defined a partial list of OVM primitives (OVMPs) for each of the fourcategory nodes: CC nodes, seed nodes, helper nodes and lites (lightweight helpers). The original7
OVMPs primitives were evaluated for completeness and consistency only conceptually without
any actual simulation/emulation [LiKG06, LKBG06, KGLY07, KLGY08]. Later, Alduailij
[Aldu15] designed and implemented an improved set (updated set) of OVMPs. In her work, the
feasibility of OVM is analyzed and proven, but privacy and security challenges were not discussed.
Instead, she recommended doing this in the future work [Aldu15]. We address the security and
privacy issues, by proposing a set of secure and privacy-preserving OVMPs, as defined in Chapter
6.

7

The original primitives are the first generation OVM primitives list in appendix A
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This subsection presents the amended version of the third-generation OVMPs required for our
baseline system (MicroOppnet v.5.2). Table 4.1 lists the upgraded OVMPs, which is including
primitive name, primitive function, and implementing nodes (names the types of oppnet nodes
implementing each primitive) [LGKY10, Aldu15].
In this research, we used selective updated OVMPs to perform simulation of our baseline
system (MicroOppnet v.5.2). We believe that these selective OVMPs enable us to evaluate the
performance measures that are the objective of this research.
Table 4.1. List of the updated third-generation OVM primitives [cf. Aldu15].
No.

a
b

Primitive Function

Primitive Name

Implementing
Nodesa

1

NODE_addNode

Add a node to oppnet

2

NODE_discover

Discover if a device has certain services

3

NODE_evalAdmit

4

NODE_getResponseb

Evaluate a device and admit it into oppnet if the
device meets criteria for admittance
Get a response by accepting an invitation to
help

5

NODE_initiate

Initiate oppnet

6

NODE_isMember

Checks if a device is already an oppnet node

7

NODE_joinOppnet

Join oppnet after admitted

8

NODE_listen

Listen for incoming messages (a blocking wait)

9

NODE_processMsg

Process a message from buffer

S, H, L

10

NODE_relNotification

Send release notification to a child helper when
no longer needed

S, H, L

11

NODE_remNode

Remove a node to oppnet

12

NODE_report

Report information to an oppnet device

S, H, L

13

NODE_reqHelp

Request help from a candidate helper

S, H, L

14

NODE_reqRelease

Request the inviting node to be released

15

NODE_scan

Scan available communication spectrum to
detect potential helpers

16

NODE_select+runTask

Select a task from the task set and execute it

17

NODE_sendData

Send data to another oppnet device

18

NODE_terminate

Terminate oppnet

19

NODE_validate

Validate the credentials of the inviting node

All
S, H
S, H
S, H, L
C
S, H, L
H, L
All

All

H, L
S, H, L
H, L
All
C
H, L

C: control center, H: helper, L: lite helper, S: seed.
NODE_getResponse is added by us. During the simulation of the baseline system (MicroOppnet v 5), we discovered

that this primitive is missing. So, we added it in this table and in our simulation.
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4.3.3. Oppnet Structure of the Baseline System
As discussed earlier, an oppnet begins its actual (and opportunistic) operations by expanding
the initial seed into an expanded oppnet. In the simplest case, the seed is a single node that invites
a large variety of new nodes for assisting the oppnet. The foreign nodes (of all kinds and
capabilities) that can be invited (or ordered) to join an oppnet are oppnet-enabled entities, which
means that they can communicate with the oppnet in its “language” of OVM primitives.
The baseline system, as any oppnet system, consists of the following three major types of
oppnet nodes (cf. [LiGY07, KLGY08, LGKY10, Aldu15, AASL18]) as shown in Fig. 4.1:
1) Seed nodes: A set of oppnet nodes that are constituted and employed together when needed to
initiate the first level of the oppnet deployment. It might be very small—in the extreme, a
single node (e.g., as discussed in the scenario in the next chapter).
2) Control Center (CC) nodes: An arbitrary subset of the seed nodes implementing together a
control center that should be available in any oppnet system. It contains a Decentralized
Oppnet Controller (DOC)8, which is responsible for managing and monitoring all oppnet’s
interactions and activities, including oppnet growth and shrinking, e.g., by admitting new
helpers to assist oppnet or by removing malicious nodes from oppnet (which is explained in
more detail in Chapter 6).
3) Helper nodes: Nodes that were originally “foreign” but eventually become “admitted and
integrated” into an oppnet to assist it in achieving its desired goals. Helper nodes must pass all
five states (potential helper, discovered helper, candidate helper, admitted helper, and
integrated helper) to join and serve the oppnet as an actual helper.
Actual helpers (usually referred to simply as helpers) include two subcategories [LKBG06,
LiGY07, LKBG07, AlLi15]: (i) Regular helpers—which can discover, invite, and admit other
helpers; they provide significant resources to the oppnet that admitted them. (ii) Lightweight
helpers a.k.a. lites—which have very limited resources, including very restricted
communication capabilities (usually due to their weak native hardware/software capabilities).

8

In this research we renamed the oppnet’s supervisor that previously called the Decentralized Command Center
(DCC), to the Decentralized Oppnet Controller (DOC). This renaming is due to the fact that its work is not limited
to being a distributed command center, but also controls and supervises all oppnet activities and operations.
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Figure 4.2. Basic oppnet structure of the baseline system.

4.3.4. Oppnet Operations of the Baseline System Using a Single
Helper
The sequence of operations for the baseline oppnet (MicroOppnet v.5.2) is illustrated in Fig.
4.3 (which is not a ladder diagram despite resembling it). The operations start with Step 1 and end
with Step 22.
The following steps (identified by the numbers in circles) demonstrate how a seed invites a
single helper to join the oppnet in order to assist it (until it is released), using the following
sequence of the updated third-generation OVMPs:
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Figure 4.3. Oppnet operations of single helper in the baseline system.
1) NODE_initiate: Decentralized Oppnet Controller (DOC) initiates seed activities.
2) NODE_scan: The seed scans available communication spectra to detect among all Potential
Helpers, a subset of those that it is able to contact, (see the helper state diagram in Fig 4.1).
3) NODE_discover: Seed looks at the subset of the Potential Helpers identified by NODE_scan
and discovers among Potential Helpers in this subset those that can provide certain resources.
These discovered Potential Helpers become Discovered Helpers (see the helper state diagram
in Fig 4.1).

54

4) NODE_reqHelp: Oppnet requests for help from a Discovered Helper to become a Candidate
Helper (in other words, it invites Discovered Helper to become a Candidate Helper). The
request help is in the form of a help message named helpObject (see the helper state diagram
in Fig 4.1).
5) NODE_ProcessMsg: The Candidate Helper reads (processes) a received request help message
from Seed Oppnet in order to make a decision to accept or reject the invitation in the next step.
6) The Candidate Helper decides to accept9 the invitation to help, becoming an Admitted Helper
(see cf. Fig 4.1).
7) NODE_getResponse: The Candidate Helper notifies Seed about its decision to help (accept
the invitation in our scenario).
8

- 10) NODE_ProcessMsg, NODE_evalAdmit, NODE_addNode: Seed reads the invitation
from the Candidate Helper, then add it as an Admitted helper, and decides that the new
Admitted Helper should be integrated and assigned tasks (see cf. Fig 4.1).

11) NODE_listen: In the meantime, after notifying Seed (in Step 7), the Candidate Helper listens
for incoming messages from Seed.
12 - 13) NODE_sendData: Seed sends data and tasks (as helpObject message) to the helper,
which simultaneously notifies the helper that it become Integrated Helper.
14) After sending data and tasks to the helper, Seed waits until oppnet goal is achieved.
15) When the helper receives data and tasks, and the implicit notification from Seed, the helper
changes its state to Integrated Helper and be ready to help (see cf. Fig 4.1).
16) NODE_select+runTask: At this moment, the helper starts selecting and performing all the
tasks assigned by Seed. When helper finishes all its tasks and duties, it sends the necessary
reports and requests to be released (unless the oppnet needs it to do another task) as described
in the next steps.
17 - 18) NODE_report, NODE_reqRelease: The helper sends information of required results
to Seed and implicitly request it to be released.

9

In another scenario the Candidate Helper could have rejection the invitation.
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19) Seed decides that the helper can be released10 because it is no longer needed.
20) NODE_relNotification: Seed releases the helper from its oppnet duty.
21) Helper can now be released and returns to its original state.
22) NODE_terminate: DOC terminates oppnet work.

4.3.5. Oppnet Operations of the Baseline System Using Multiple
Helpers
The baseline system (MicroOppnet v.5.2) consists of a seed, CC, and helpers (regulars and
lites). The process of oppnet [change all to lower case] growth begins when the seed starts to
expand (if necessary), by scanning and discovering the nearest oppnet-enabled helpers. The seed
becomes the root of the search and expansion process for the oppnet. Fig. 4.4 illustrates growth of
an oppnet from its seed.
In general, there are different models and approaches (search techniques and methods) of
requesting assistances from potential oppnet helpers (in terms of which an oppnet node has its turn
to invite the next potential helper for help). Different search techniques are best for different oppnet
application, especially in the areas and zones that contain many sensor devices that may serve the
oppnet in reaching its desired goal.
In our baseline system design (MicroOppnet v.5.2), we propose to use a simple search method
called Level-by-Level (L2) helper selection method. The L2 method provides "fairness" in the
coverage of the area of oppnet operation by helpers (trying to avoid having too many helpers in
some sub-area and too few in other sub-area). In other words, L2 method scans and discovers all
possible potential helpers and invites them to join an oppnet in a fair manner. An oppnet can
expand omnidirectionally.

10

In some cases, Seed can keep helper when needed for another task.
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Figure 4.4. Illustration of oppnet growth by L2 method in the baseline system.

4.3.5.1. Oppnet Expansion by Using L2 Method
This subsection introduces a simple algorithm to grow a seed (or already expanded) oppnet
into a larger expanded oppnet through finding new helpers level by level until the oppnet goal is
achieved. The algorithm steps are as follows:
1) Seed begins by inviting all potential helpers who meet the following conditions:
a) They fall within the communication range of the seed (within the reach of the seed oppnet).
b) They have compatible communication technologies (e.g., Wi-Fi, ZigBee, Bluetooth, etc.)
that are used by the seed.
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2) Potential helpers (PHs) who were invited or ordered to join become candidate helpers if:
a) They are oppnet-enabled devices (recall that a device can become oppnet-enabled by
installation of a few of OVM primitives).
b) They join oppnet because: (i) they have underutilized resources and are willing to help
oppnet; (ii) the oppnet needs help because with more urgent task (e.g., the oppnet is
involved with the rescue and recovery operations with life-or-death consequences).
3) Candidate helpers—they have adequate capabilities to perform the tasks under hand— are
selected and admitted by an oppnet become actual helpers (usually referred to simply as
helpers or Hs).
4) New helpers who have been accepted by seed oppnet are added into a queue called Admitted
Helper Queue (AHQ) which identify the helpers (parent helpers) that be used in the first level
of the oppnet growth, as shown in Fig 4.4. Each level-helpers has its AHQ containing new
helpers (which identifies child helpers that comprise the next level of oppnet growth). In this
case, we note that the children of seed node(s) can generate new children of helpers (the next
level)—they are descendants of the seed helpers, and so on—until the oppnet goal is achieved.
5) Level-by-Level (L2) method is used in the process of oppnet growth in order to achieve the
fairness in inviting new helpers. Therefore, an oppnet grows into all directions
(omnidirectionally), increasing the chances of finding the target node (avoiding the risk that
helpers will “move” in the directions away from the target node).
Fig. 4.5 and 4.6 illustrates the flow diagram for the L2 method.
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Figure 4.5. The flow diagram for the L2 method.
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Figure 4. 6. The flow diagram for the L2 method (continued).
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4.3.5.2. Explanation for Using L2 Method for Oppnet Expansion
In this section we present an example that shows how a seed oppnet grows into an expanded
oppnet by using the L2 method. Table 4.2. illustrates an example of using the L2 method in the
process of the expanded oppnet fashion. In this example, Seed (S0) initiates to expand in response
to a particular event, it begins searching (Scan & Discover) for assistance from potential helpers
(PHs) around it. Then, it turns out that Seed has a connection (it has a same communication
channel) to the following potential helpers: PH1, PH2, PH3, … , PH6 as shown in Fig4.7 (a).
Eventually all these potential helpers receive and accept the invitation (request for hep) from the
inviting node (S0). Therefore, Seed randomly admitted and integrated them with its resources and
make them join the oppnet as actual helpers (simply named as H) as shown in the Round 1 in Fig.
4.7 (b). Thus, the growth process continues level by level until reaching the final helper (target)
that can achieve the oppnet goal. Note that in each round there is a parent level invites the child
level. Also, at each level, the helper has the right to invite at least one helper for assistance in each
iteration. This is because it is impossible to predict exactly where the target is. Furthermore, it is
not all the potential helpers (or candidate helpers) have been accepted at all levels. This is due to
one of the following reasons (but not limited to): (i) they do not respond the invitation, because
potential helper is probably not supported (oppnet-unabled device), (ii) they are too busy at this
moment (time of the invitation), (iii) for any other technical reasons related to the potential helpers
at this time.
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Figure 4.7. Example of using the L2 method for oppnet expansion

4.3.5.3. Optimization of the L2 Method
We believe that L2 method should behave well if there are no too many potential helpers
behind each level. However, if there are too many potential helpers at a certain level, the growth
of oppnet get stuck on this level (limiting the geographical area of oppnet). Moreover, the oppnet
growth reaches the saturation point if all potential helpers are used or invited per each node. This
may reduce the success rates of the oppnet and reduce its performance.
We can solve this challenge by reducing use or invite all potential helpers by each level (if
there are a lot of potential helpers behind each level). The idea is that distributing the load over
multiple nodes leads to a better resource’s utilization and better performance. This idea can be
achieved by limiting the number of admitted potential helpers per node.
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4.4. Challenges and Limitations of the Baseline System
Maybe the most critical limitation of the presented baseline system design was excluding from
it any privacy and security considerations. We address these challenges by introducing the
proposed solution in Chapter 6.

4.5. Chapter Conclusions
This chapter discussed the baseline system design, including justification and motivation,
requirements and features, as well as oppnet node, message, and task specifications. We then
presented the architecture of the baseline system, which includes: the helper lifecycle state diagram
for the baseline system, updated third-generation OVMPs for the baseline system, oppnet structure
for the baseline system, and basic oppnet operations for the baseline system using a single/multiple
helper(s). Finally, the chapter presented the L2 algorithm for oppnet expansion.
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CHAPTER 5

SIMULATION DESIGN FOR THE BASELINE
SYSTEM

5.1. Introduction
In this chapter, we discuss the design of a simulation for MicroOppnet v.5.2 using the L2
method to find potential helpers. MicroOppnet v.5.2 serves as the baseline for performance
analysis of the system proposed in the next chapter. This includes the simulation scenario and
details of the simulation design for the baseline system.

5.2. Simulation Scenario for MicroOppnet v.5.2
This section presents a simulation health emergency scenario for the baseline system
(MicroOppnet v.5.2). This includes scenario specifications and components as well as scenario
description (and scenario steps) for the baseline system.

5.2.1. Scenario Component Specifications
The specifications of the oppnet nodes used in the baseline system (MicroOppnet v.5.2) are
listed in Table 5.1. These nodes include seed and helpers.
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Table 5.1. Specification oppnet nodes used in MicroOppnet v.5.2.
Node
ID
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8

Node Type
Seed
Potential
Helper
Potential
Helper
Potential
Helper
Potential
Helper
Potential
Helper
Potential
Helper
Potential
Helper
Target Node

Node Device
Wristband

Node
Position
(X0, Y0)

{BT, ZigBee}

Tablet1

(X1, Y1)

{BT, ZigBee}

Printer
Streetlight
ParkingMeter
DigitalTV
Tablet2

(X2, Y2)
(X3, Y3)
(X4, Y4)
(X5, Y5)
(X6, Y6)

Communication Protocol

{BT, ZigBee}
{BT, ZigBee}
{BT, ZigBee}
{BT, ZigBee}
{BT, ZigBee}

DBserver

(X7, Y7)

{WiFi, BT}

Smartphone

(Xn, Yn)

{BT, ZigBee, WiFi, Cellular}

Oppnet
Support
Enabled
Enabled
Enabled
Enabled
Enabled
Enabled
Enabled
Enabled
Enabled

Note that in our scenario, Wristband is both a single seed oppnet node and the CC node—
containing DOC—which is responsible for managing all oppnet operations and activities.
Wristband (Node ID = 0) uses Bluetooth technology (BT) to look for potential helpers around it
(within the BT range referred to as the broken line circle), as shown in Fig 5.1. These potential
helpers include PH1, PH2, PH3, PH4, PH5, and PH6 (i.e., the oppnet-enabled devices with Node
IDs 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6). As will be presented in more detail in the next subsection, PH2 will succeed
in contacting PH4, which will succeed in contacting PH5, etc., until PH9 is contacted. Target Node
is a special potential helper (with Node ID = 8) that capable to contact 9-1-1. In our scenario and
simulation, Smartphone (Cellphone) is a Target Node (TN). Note that the oppnet succeeds only
when the Target Node is reached.
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Figure 5.1. The MicroOppnet v.5.2 components for the baseline healthcare scenario.

5.2.2. Scenario Steps
This subsection describes the health emergency scenario used for the baseline system
(MicroOppnet v.5.2), as illustrated in Fig. 5.2.
Suppose that Alex was very exhausted while returning from work. Suddenly, he lost
consciousness outdoors. Alex's Body Sensor Network (BSN) Wristband detects that he has
symptoms of a syncope (loss of consciousness)11 and needs an emergency assistance. Fig. 5.2
illustrates how Alex's Wristband (simply referred to as Wristband) plays the role of the seed
11

The symptoms include: low blood sugar, low blood pressure, and low temperature.
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oppnet. The oppnet follows the following scenario steps (steps in the scenario identified by the
numbers in circles):

Figure 5.2. The baseline healthcare scenario of MicroOppnet v.5.2.
Step 1: Wristband initiates the oppnet expansion process by admitting the first potential helper
PH2 as admitted helper H2 (Tablet1), by following sub-steps:
A) Creating the help object message (helpObject) that includes all required oppnet data
and tasks (see Step 1in cf. Fig. 4.3).
B) Scanning and discovering potential helpers using NODE_scan (Item 15 in Table 4.1,
and Step 2 in Fig. 4.3) and NODE_disccover (Item 2 in Table 4.1, and Step 3 in Fig.
4.3). Wristband discovers a potential helper PH2 (Tablet1 held by a woman sitting
on the bench across the street, as shown in Fig. 5.1). Then, by using NODE_reqHelp
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(Item 13 in Table 4.1, and Step 4 in Fig. 4.3) Wristband invites the Discovered
Potential Helper PH2 (Tablet1) to become a Candidate Helper (corresponding to
the helper state diagram in Fig 4.1). When the Candidate Helper Tablet1 receives the
invitation, Tablet1 decides to accept it and join the oppnet (see Steps 5 and 6 in Fig.
4.3). It also notifies the seed (Wristband) about its acceptance of the invitation to
help, using for this purpose NODE_getResponse (Item 4 in Table 4.1, and Step 7 in
Fig. 4.3).
C) Admitting12 the Candidate Helper Tablet1 as an Admitted Helper H2 (as indicated in
Fig. 5.2) since it meets the criteria (checked by using NODE_evalAdmit to evaluate
Tablet1 in terms of adequate capabilities, etc.; see Item 3 in Table 4.1, and Step 9 in
Fig. 4.3). The inviting node (Wristband) then adds H2 (Tablet1) to its list of
children (by using NODE_addNode, see Item 1 in Table 4.1, and Step 10 in Fig. 4.3).
D) Sending helpObject containing oppnet data and tasks to the Integrated (Actual)
Helper H2 (Tablet1) by using NODE_sendData (Item 17 in Table 4.1, and Step 12
and Step 13 in Fig. 4.3).
Step 2: Upon receiving the helpObject message received from Wristband, Helper H2
(Tablet1) checks if it can perform the oppnet goal, which is calling the emergency number 9-11. However, Tablet1 is incapable of contacting 9-1-1 due to the lack of a cellular phone
capability or a Wi-Fi connectivity. So, it is only able to display the help message to attract attention
of its owner (the woman sitting on the bench, as shown in Fig. 5.2), hoping that its owner will see
the message.
Since Helper H2 (Tablet1) is not sure if its owner will notify 9-1-1; it then looks for other
potential helpers via its Bluetooth and ZigBee networks (it can use both of them). Helper H2
(Tablet1) first looks for Bluetooth devices but finds none within its reach. Next, it searches for
the ZigBee devices (within its range). It finds three Potential Helpers: PH1 (ParkingMeter), PH3
(Streetlight), and PH4 (DigitalTV), as illustrated in Fig 5.2. After Helper H2 validates that

12

For the convenience of the reader, we do not repeat the sub-steps A-D in the next steps. Although it is necessary to
in the process of admitting the potential helpers (PH1, PH2, PH3, …, PH9) showing in Fig. 5.1 to the Admitted
Helpers (H1, H2, H3, …, H9) as shown in Fig. 5.2, by using selective OVMPs that are necessary (corresponding to
Table 4.1 and Fig. 4.3).
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all three potential helpers are not oppnet members yet (by using NODE_isMember, Item 6 in Table
4.1), it then sends requests for help to all of them (and become candidate helpers). Eventually,
these three candidate helpers accept the invitation for assistance, and then admitted by H2 to join
the oppnet (becoming helpers H2, H3, and H4, as shown in Fig. 5.2). After Helper H2 evaluating
the adequate capabilities of these helpers (using NODE_evalAdmit, Item 3 in Table 4.1, and Step
9 in Fig. 4.3), it ultimately chooses Helper H4 (DigitalTV in a nearby house) since it has more
capabilities for displaying the help message.
Step 3: Upon receiving the help object message (received from the seed via H2), Helper H4
(DigitalTV) displays the helpObject message on its screen to attract TV viewers’ attention.
Since the Helper H4 is not sure if any of its TV viewers will notify 9-1-1, it searches for its potential
helpers on the ZigBee network (the only network it is connected to) and discovers Printer in a
neighbor’s house. In a due process, Printer becomes Helper H5 and receives the help object
message.
Step 4: After H5 received helpObject, it immediately prints the helpObject message (hoping
that a human will see it, but no one has seen it). Thus, Helper H5 (Printer) searches for its
potential helpers on its ZigBee network (the only one it is connected to). H5 discovers its potential
helper, Streetlight, which in a due process becomes Helper H6.
Step 5: Helper H6 (Streetlight) can only forward the help object message to its nearest
potential helper (via its ZigBee network), Tablet2 in a nearby house, as shown in Fig. 5.2. In a
due process, Tablet2 becomes Helper H8.
Step 6: Helper H8 finds another potential helper Smartphone in a car passing by the house and
forwards the helpObject message to it via its Bluetooth network. In a due process, Smartphone
becomes Helper H9
Step 7: Eventually in this scenario, Helper H9 (Smartphone) is a Target Node that can notify 91-1 and achieve the oppnet goal. Therefore, H9 (Smartphone) can use not only the Bluetooth or
ZigBee network but also its Cellular connectivity. It can call the 9-1-1 service, and then passing
the helpObject containing the help message created by the seed (Wristband). This message
can be delivered in the form an SMS message or a voice message.
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In this way, the task of this helper (H9) is completed in particular, and the oppnet goal (notifying
9-1-1) has been achieved13 in general. But in the real system, release for all helpers (H1-H9) that
used by the seed would occur now14. However, we do not simulate release helpers in our scenario.
We must note that in our scenario the devices were asked for help without specifying what kind of
help was needed. A helper unable to perform the requested task had to forward the task to the nextlevel helpers. OVM primitives allow also for an alternative approach, in which candidate helpers
are asked by the inviting node if they can perform the required tasks; the response becomes a
criterion for selecting helpers from a set of candidate helpers.

5.3. Simulation Assumptions for MicroOppnet v.5.2
This subsection presents the simulation assumptions including: general assumptions, helperrelated assumptions, message-related assumptions, and technology-related assumptions.
Since the baseline system simulation is just a slight modification of the simulation provided
by Alduailij [Aldu15], our simulation scenario, assumptions, and input parameters are very similar
(in some cases identical) to those used by Alduailij.

5.3.1. General Assumptions
The general assumptions for the simulation of the baseline system are as follows:
1) We use a few different simulation area sizes: 300 m by 300 m, 400 m by 400 m, 500 m by
500 m, and 600 m by 600 m.
2) The oppnet succeeds when it reaches to a Target Node (capable to contact 9-1-1 service).

13

In fact, the oppnet goal could have been achieved earlier, maybe even by the first helper (H2) joined the oppnet (if
it had, e.g., cellphone or other capabilities to contact the 9-1-1 service).
14
Hence, H9 must ask its parent (H8) to be released. In turn, H8 asks its parent (H6) to release it, and so on. The chain
of request to release of some time reaches H2. Then, H2 asks the seed (Wristband) to be released. Since the oppnet
goal (notifying 9-1-1) is achieved, Seed releases H2. H2 releases its child (H4), and so on. At some time, H8 is
released by its parent (H6) and it releases H9. Now, all helpers have been released and return to their original status.
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3) In In general, all potential helpers are distributed equally in a given simulation geographic area
(except seed and target node) as follows:
a) Seed node: Located in the center of the simulation area.
b) Target node: Located on one corner of the simulation area. If there are more than one target
node, are distributed on the other corners.
c) All other potential helpers: Distributed equally in a given simulation geographic area for
all four quarters.
4) The workload ratio for a node is the ratio of the actual/current workload to workload capacity
for this node. We assume that any candidate helper which has the workload ratio <95% is
willing to help.15
5) If an oppnet node runs more than one application, we assume that:
a) If the node is a regular helper, then multiple applications are run on it in parallel—since
we assume that such nodes have fewer parallel applications than processors or cores.
b) If the node is a lite, then multiple applications are run on it sequentially—since we
assume that such nodes have a single-core processor.

5.3.2. Helper-Related Assumptions
After checking the current directory for reservist helpers and scanning for ad hoc helpers, the
inviting node uses the following criteria for inviting helpers:
A) Helper’s communication protocol: the helper should be equipped with at least one of the
communication protocols (cf. Table 5.1) available to the inviting node;
B) Helper’s location: (i) within the simulation area, and (ii) within the communication range
of the inviting node.16

15

16

This is an assumption since, in general, any ad hoc helper may refuse to help; only reservist helpers have to help.
“Basic Oppnet Operations,” if the helper is able to perform all tasks assigned to by the inviting node alone, then it does so. Once
the tasks are completed, the helper reports task completion to the inviting node. Consequently, the inviting node (or the CC) can
release the helper. On the other hand, if the helper is unable to execute all the tasks from the list of assigned tasks without a
further help, the helper can look for its own (next-level) helpers and assign to them the “remaining” tasks—the ones it cannot
complete itself. (This includes the special case when a helper is unable to perform any tasks, but is able to locate next-level
helpers, to which it forwards the whole task list.)
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5.3.3. Message-Related Assumptions
This subsection starts by defining the types of simulated messages and their payloads. We then
show how size of each message payload was calculated for the simulation of the baseline system
(MicroOppnet v.5.2), analogously as it was calculated in MicroOppnet v.5 [Aldu15]. Here we
present the calculations of times needed for reading message payloads.

5.3.3.1.

Type of Simulated Messages

This subsection defines the oppnet messages used in the baseline simulation.

A. Oppnet Control Messages
Oppnet Control Messages are text messages that are exchanged between oppnet nodes and
trigger an action by the receiving node. The specifications of the oppnet control messages for the
simulation are as explained in Chapter 4.

B. Data Messages
Data Messages are messages that contain data objects created initially by the CC node and sent
from each inviting node (parent) to its admitted helpers (direct children). The two main data
messages for this simulation are Help Object Messages and Oppnet Task Messages.
Help Object Messages: The Help Object Messages are messages containing helpObject which is an
object created by the seed Wristband and passed from each inviting node to all its direct children. The
helpObject is composed of the following:
1) A help text message (helpTextMsg): indicating that a person has collapsed and needs an urgent help.
2) A person’s profile (personProfile): containing the current person’s location, name, age, weight,
allergies, etc.
3) A person’s contact information (personContact): for her primary healthcare facility.

4) A person’s recent vitals (personVitals): such as temperature, blood pressure, etc.
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Oppnet Task Messages: Oppnet Task Messages contain the list of oppnet tasks created by the
CC/seed (Wristband in this simulation scenario), and passed from each inviting node to all its
direct children.

5.3.3.2.

Size of Message Payload

In this subsection we present the size of each message payload as was calculated in
MicroOppnet v.5 [Aldu15].

A. Sizes of Used Data Types
Table 5.2 illustrates data string size calculation [ChCo15, JaMe15]. Therefore, an empty string
uses up to 40 B.
Table 5.2. Data string size [Aldu15].
Field
Size [B]

Header
8

Header
8

Char array
length
value
4

Pointer

Number of
chars * 2

4

Offset
4

Length
4

Hash
code

Padding

4

Round up
to
multiple
of 8

B. Payload Size of Oppnet Control Messages
The payload of each oppnet control message is represented as a string. To show how sizes of
the payloads of oppnet control messages were calculated [Aldu15], consider as an example the
admission notification message “Admitted into oppnet”.17 In his case the string contains 20
characters, so the char array requires 12 B plus 40 B for 20 chars (2B per char), that is 52 B. Since
52 is not a multiple of 8, we need to round up to the next multiple of 8, which is 56. Therefore, in

17

We need to add two comments. First, we use a simplifying assumption that a single oppnet is in a given computing
environment. In general an oppnet identifier will be needed in this and other messages (so any candidate helper can distinguish
multiple oppnets contacting it). Second, we keep messages human-readable. If necessary to shorten the messages, computerreadable messages could be much more succinct.
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total our text will use 56 B + 24 B (which is string header 8 B + pointer to char array 4 B + offset
4 B + length of the string 4 B + hash code 4 B) = 80 B.
Payloads sizes of oppnet control messages are summarized in Table 5.3.

C.

Payload Size of Data Messages
This subsection describes how the payload size of data messages is calculated [Aldu15].

Help Object Messages: To calculate the size of a Help Object Message payload (helpObject),

we consider the following:
1) Number of characters in the string variables is determined by the values used in our simulation.
2) The size of the empty object which is 8 B for the object header [JaMe15].
3) The size of the string used for the help text message (helpTextMsg) is calculated based on our
calculations of string size in Subsection 5.2.4.2.1–Sizes of Used Data Types. We assume that
the help text message includes 31 characters. The string object itself still requires 24 B. But
now the char array requires 12 B of header plus 31 char * 2 B/char =62 B for the 31 chars.
Since 12 B + 62 B = 74 B is not a multiple of 8, we also need to round up to the next multiple
of 8 (80). Therefore, in total helpTextMsg will use 80 B + 24 B = 104 B.
4) We assume that a person profile includes 137 characters. The size of the string used for the
person profile (personProfile) is 312 B. (Calculations are analogous to those in Item 3
above.)
5) We assume that person contact includes 102 characters. The size of the string used for the
person contacts (personContact) is 240 B. (Calculations are analogous to those in Item 3
above.)
6) We assume that person vitals include 114 characters. The size of the string used for the person
vitals (personVitals) is 264 B. (Calculations are analogous to those in Item 3 above.)
7) Therefore, the total size of helpObject = 8 B for empty object header + 104 B for
helpTextMsg + 312 B for personProfile + 240 B for personContact + 264 B for
personVitals = 920 B. See No. 2 in Table 5.3 for Size of helpObject.

74

Table 5.3. Size of message payloads [Aldu15].

No.

1

2

Message Name and
Definition

Oppnet Control
Message

Data
Message

Help Object
Message
Oppnet
Task
Message

Message Payload
Help request
Join request
Admit notification
Release request
Release notification

Size of
Message
Payload[B]
128 B
64 B
80 B
96 B
72 B

The help object (helpObject)

920 B

The list of oppnet tasks
(oppnetTasks)

556 B

Oppnet Task Messages: To calculate the size of an Oppnet Task Message payload
(oppnetTasks), we consider the following [Aldu15]:
1) The size of the oppnetTasks empty array is 12 B.
2) The total size of the strings in oppnetTasks is 544 B. (Based on our calculations of string
size in Subsection 5.2.4.2.1. and number of characters in each task used in our simulation.
3) Therefore, the total size of oppnetTasks= 12 B (for array size) + 544 B = 556 B.
4) See No. 2 in Table 5.3 for Size of oppnetTasks.

5.3.3.3.

Message Payload Reading Time

Message that arrives includes both control fields and payload fields. We consider that all fields
(not just payload fields) are read at the receiving node. Control fields would be read by OS, and
payload fields by the application. Based on the values of control fields, OS would deliver the
payload to a proper application. However, message headers is done by a kernel (of the OS) and
kernel execution is orders of execution faster, since kernel code responsible for sending/receiving
messages is implemented in an assembly language (not in Java –as assumed for the application-
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level oppnet code). Therefore, in calculation of the message reading time we only consider the
payload fields.
Message payload reading time is the execution time for reading the payload of an oppnet
message read at the receiving node, we calculated the payload message reading time for oppnet
control messages and for data messages (i.e., helpObject and oppnetTasks).
In general, we calculate execution time T for a given code [CyIn15] as follows:
T = (CPI * IC) / PF

(1)

where CPI denotes cycles per instruction, IC is instruction count (the number of instructions being
executed), and PF is processor frequency.
We use Formula 1 for calculating message content payload reading time. The following
assumptions are made:
1) CPI = 1 (this assumption is based on the average CPI for benchmark programs [CyIn15]).
1) IC for reading oppnet message payload [instr.] =
= (size of message payload18 [B]) * (IC per byte of transferred data [instr./B] )
For example, to calculate reading time for helpObject (data message payload) by a Tablet
(Nexus 9, with a 2.3 GHz processor) the following calculations are performed:
2) IC for reading helpObject = (size of helpObject [B]) * (IC per byte of transferred data
[instr./B] ) = 920 B * 2 instr./B 19 =1840 instr.
3) T = (CPI * IC) / PF =
= (1 [1/instr.] * 1840 instr.) / 2.3 GHz = 1840/ 2.3 * 10^9 [1/s]
= 0.8 × 10-3 ms

18

See Table 5-III for payload size for each message.

19

Reading 1 B of data requires 1 LDRB instruction and 1 STRB instruction. LDRB is a data transfer instruction used to load a byte
of data from memory to a CPU register for reading. STRB is a data transfer instruction (following LDRB) to transfer a byte of
data from a CPU register back to memory.
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5.3.4. Technology-Related Assumptions
Table 5.4 summarizes the message payload reading times (execution times) for each of the
used technologies [Aldu15].
Table 5.4. Message payload reading times for used technologies [cf. Aldu15].

No.

Message
Payload
Reading
Time for
Admitted
Helpers

1

Message
Payload
Reading
Time for
Seed

2

*

Parameter

*

Exact
Value
[ms]

Approx.
Value for
Simulation
[ms]

Tablet (Nexus 9, 2.3
GHz)

0.8 × 10-3

0

See Table Notes 1, 2,
and 3

Digital TV (Samsung
2013, 1.35 GHz)

1.4 × 10-3

0

See Table Notes 1, 2,
and 3

Smartphone (Nexus 5,
2.26 GHz)

0.82 ×
10-3

0

See Table Notes 1, 2,
and 3

DB Server (HP
ProLiant DL560 Gen8,
2.2 GHz)

0.84 ×
10-3

0

See Table Notes 1, 2,
and 3

Printer (HP Officejet
Pro 8630, 600 MHz)

3.07 ×
10-3

0

See Table Notes 1, 2,
and 3

Embedded systems
such as the ones in
parking meters, street
lights, sensors, etc.

29–43

29–43

Cf. Ref. [LMSL10].
See Table Note 3

Embedded systems
such as the ones in
wristbands

29–43

29–43

Cf. Ref. [LMSL10].
See Table Note 3

Standard/Technology

Comments

Parameters shown in Table 5.4 are not variables in the simulation, since they are not used directly in the simulation;
they are instead used to obtain the values for parameters shown in Table 5.6 (listing parameters/variables of the
simulation program).
Table Notes:
1) Calculated using Formula 1 in Subsection 5.3.3.3.
2) The message payload reading times are for reading helpObject, which is the largest message payload 920 B
among all payloads. Since the values for reading helpObject are minuscule, we set zero as the values for time
for reading oppnetTasks and the payloads of oppnet control messages, because they are even smaller.
3) Some parameters have a range of values while others have single values; the reasons for such a difference
are:
a)

Some parameters (such as message payload reading time for embedded systems) were taken from
references specified in the last section; such references indicate the values of the best case and worst
case; hence the range of values.

b) Other parameters—specifically message payload reading time for regular helpers and message payload
reading time for printer—were calculated using Formula 1, which calculates the message reading time
for processors specific to those devices, hence the single value.
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5.3.4.1.

Delivery Time

In the baseline simulation, we consider packet delivery time–defined as the time period from
the moment when the first bit of a packet leaves the transmitter (the transmitting node, the sender,
the sending node) until the moment when the last bit of this packet is received by the receiver (the
receiving node) [TrTi15]. We use the following formula to calculate packet delivery time [TrTi15]:
packet delivery time = packet transmission time + packet propagation time (2)
Packet transmission time is defined as the time period from the moment when the first bit of
the packet leaves the transmitter until the moment when the last bit of the packet leaves the
transmitter [TrTi15]. We use the following formula to calculate packet transmission time [TrTi15]:
packet transmission time = packet size / bit rate (3)
Packet propagation time is defined as the time period from the moment when the last bit of
the message leaves the transmitter until the moment when the last bit of the message is received
by the receiver [TrTi15]. We assume that a wireless communication link has the bandwidth large
enough not to slow down transmission of the message bits, so that the propagation time for the bits
is on the order of the speed of light (cf. Ref. [TrTi15]).
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Table 5.5. Delivery parameters of used communication technologies [Aldu15].
No.

1

2

3

4

*

Stand
ard/
Technolog
y
ZigBee

BT

Wi-Fi

Cellular

Parameter*

Exact and
Simulation Value

Comment

Delivery time [ms] for oppnet
control message
Delivery Time [ms] for help object
message containing helpObject
Delivery Time [ms] for oppnet task
message containing oppnetTasks
Transmission Range [m]
Maximum Payload Size [B]
Delivery Time [ms] for oppnet
control message
Delivery Time [ms] for help object
message containing helpObject
Delivery Time [ms] for oppnet task
message containing oppnetTasks
Transmission Range [m]

4.928

Maximum Payload Size [B]

343

Delivery Time [ms] for oppnet
control message
Delivery Time [ms] for help object
message containing helpObject
Delivery Time [ms] for oppnet task
message containing oppnetTasks
Transmission Range [m]

0.1312

Maximum Payload Size [B]
Delivery Time [ms] for SMS help
message delivered to 9-1-1
Transmission Range [m]

1500
4060 ms
∞

If a device has a cellular
connection, it can
communicate with other
devices through the
cellular network, no matter
how far they are. Hence the
infinite transmission.

Maximum Payload Size [B]

140 8-bit
characters
(160 7-bit
characters)

Cf. Ref. [ShMS15]

34.84
21.12
100
72
0.383
2.582
1.566
100

0.765
0.4736
∞

See No. 6 in Subsection
5.3.4.1 (A)
See No. 7 in Subsection
5.3.4.1. (A)
See No. 8 in Subsection
5.3.4.1 (A)
Cf. Ref. [Zigb15]
Cf. Ref. [KnBa15]
See No. 5 in Subsection
5.3.4.1 (B)
See No. 6 in Subsection
5.3.4.1 (B)
See No. 7 in Subsection
5.3.4.1 (B)
Cf. Refs. [Blut15, BlWi15,
BlSp15]
Cf. Ref. [Blut15]
See No. 5 in Subsection
5.3.4.1 (C)
See No. 6 in Subsection
5.3.4.1 (C)
See No. 7 in Subsection
5.3.4.1 (C)
If a device has a Wi-Fi
connection, it can
communicate with other
devices through the
Internet, no matter how far
they are. Hence the infinite
transmission range.
Cf. Refs. [TrTi15, Ieee15]
Cf. Ref. [SaBB15]

Parameters shown in Table 5.5 are not variables in the simulation, since they are not used directly in the
simulation; they are instead used to get the values of the parameters in Table 5.6 (listing
parameters/variables of the simulation program).

79

A. ZigBee
To calculate delivery time for messages sent via ZigBee we make the following assumptions
[KnBa15]:
1) ZigBee 802.15.4, 2.4 GHz Series 2 modules;
2) Data rate of 250 Kbps;
3) Maximum payload of 72 B;
4) Packet header of 13 B.
Based on 1–4 above and Formulas 2 and 3 in Subsection 5.3.4.1:
5) For a packet with max. payload size 72 B, ZigBee delivery time [ms] =
= ((13 B header + 72 B) × 8 b/B) / (250 Kbps × 103) ≈ 2.720 ms
6) To deliver the largest oppnet control message (i.e., help request) of size 128 B, we need 1
packet with maximum payload 72 B and 1 packet with 56 B payload. Therefore, ZigBee
delivery time [ms] for the oppnet control message containing help request can be calculated
as:
(no. packets with 72 B payload size [packet] × delivery time per 72 B packet [ms/packet])
+
(no. packets with 56 B payload size [packet] × delivery time per 56 B packet
[ms/packet]) =
= (1 packet × 2.720 ms/packet) + (1 packet × 2.208 ms/packet) ≈ 4.928 ms
7) To deliver a help object message containing helpObject of size 920 B, we need 12 packets
with maximum payload 72 B and 1 packet with 56 B payload size. Therefore, ZigBee delivery
time [ms] for the help object message containing helpObject can be calculated as:
(number of packets sent with payload 72 [packet] × delivery time per packet with
payload of size 72 B [ms/packet])
+ (number of packets sent with payload of size 56 B [packet] × delivery time per packet
with payload of size 56 B [ms/packet]) =
= (12 packet × 2.720 ms/packet) + (1 packet × 2.2 ms/per packet) ≈ 34.84 ms

80

8) Calculation of ZigBee delivery time for the oppnet task message containing oppnetTasks (of
size 556 B; cf. Table 5.5) is analogous to Item 3; it is 21.12 ms.
Row No.1 in Table 5.5 summarizes ZigBee delivery time for 3 different oppnet messages.

B. Bluetooth (BT)
To calculate delivery time for messages sent via BT we make the following assumptions (Ref.
[BlSp15]):
1) Bluetooth v.4.0 at 2.4 GHz;
2) Data rate of 3 Mbps;
3) Maximum payload of 343 B;
4) Access code of 72 b, and header of 54 b;
Based on Nos. 1–4 of this subsection and Formulas 2 and 3 in Subsection 5.3.4.1:
5) BT delivery time of the largest oppnet control message (i.e., help request) of size
128 B sent in a single packet =
= ((128 B × 8 b/B) + (72 b access code + 54 b header)) / (3 Mbps × 106 b/s)
≈ 0.383 ms
6) To deliver a help object message containing helpObject of size 920 B, we need 2 packets
with maximum payload 343 B and 1 packet with 234 B payload. Therefore, The following
calculations are needed:
a) BT delivery time per packet with payload of size 343 B [ms/packet]) =
= ((343 B × 8 b/B) + (72 b access code + 54 b header)) / (3 Mbps × 106 b/s)
≈ 0.956 ms
b) BT delivery time per packet with payload of size 234 B [ms/packet]) =
= ((234 B × 8 b/B) + (72 b access code + 54 b header)) / (3 Mbps × 106 b/s)
≈ 0.67 ms
c) BT delivery time [ms] for a help object containing helpObject can be calculated as:
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(number of packets sent with payload of size 343 B [packet] × delivery time per
packet with payload of size 343 B [ms/packet])
+ (number of packets sent with payload of size 236 B [packet]
× delivery time per packet with payload of size 236 B [ms/packet])
= (2 packet × 0.956 ms/packet) + (1 packet × 0.67 ms/packet)
≈ 2.582 ms
7) BT Delivery time for data message containing oppnetTasks is analogous to No. 2.
Row No.2 in Table 5.5 summarizes BT delivery time for oppnet messages.

C. Wi-Fi
To calculate delivery time for messages sent via Wi-Fi we make the following assumptions
(cf. Refs. [TrTi15, Ieee15]):
1) Wireless Internet standards 802.11b and 802.11g, both at 2.4 GHz;
2) Data rate of 10 Mbps [TrTi15] (a conservative assumption);
3) Maximum payload of 1500 B;
4) MAC header of 32 B. Frame Check Sequence (FCS) of 4 B.
Based on Nos. 1–4 of this subsection and Formulas 2 and 3 in Subsection 5.3.4.1:
5) Wi-Fi delivery time of the largest oppnet control message (i.e., help request) of size
128 B sent in a single packet =
= ((128 B + 32 B MAC header + 4 B FCS) × 8 b/B) / (10 Mbps × 106 b/s)
≈ 0.1312 ms
6) Wi-Fi delivery time for a help object message containing helpObject of size 920 B
sent in a single packet =
= ((920 B + 32 B MAC header + 4 B FCS) × 8 b/B) / (10 Mbps × 106 b/s)
≈ 0.765 ms
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7) Wi-Fi Delivery time for an oppnet task message containing oppnetTasks is analogous to
No. 2.
Row No.3 in Table 5.5 summarizes Wi-Fi delivery time for oppnet messages.

D. Cellular
The following assumptions are made:
1) 3G Cellular is used;
2) Maximum payload is140 8-bit characters (160 7-bit characters) [ShMS15].
Cellular delivery time of a SMS containing helpTextMsg delivered to 9-1-1 is 4,060 ms
[SaBB15]. See Row No. 4 in Table 5.5.

5.4. Simulation Input Parameters
Table 5.6 describes input parameters and their value ranges.
Table 5.6. Input parameters [Aldu15].
No.

1

2

3

Value
Range
Input Parameters for the Simulation Area

Parameter

Minimum and Maximum X /Y Coordinate
(0–areaMaxX/areaMaxY)

0 m – Max m

Input Parameters for the Node Set
1–k
where k is
Minimum and Maximum Number of PHs
the number
Requested for Help
of PHs
(requestedHelpersMin–
within the
requestedHelpersMax)
range of the
requesting
oppnet node
Input Parameters for Individual Nodes
Approximate Message Payload Reading Time
for Admitted Helpers
0 ms
(approxMsgPayloadReadTimeRegHlpr)
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Description
Minimum and
maximum values for
the X/Y coordinate of
the simulation area.

The baseline system.

Cf. No. 1 in Table 5.4

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

Range of Values for Message Payload Reading
Time for Lites
29 ms–43 ms
(msgPayloadReadTimeLiteMin–
msgPayloadReadTimeLiteMax)
Range of Values for Message Payload Reading
Time for Seed Nodes
29 ms–43 ms
(msgPayloadReadTimeSeedMin–
msgPayloadReadTimeSeedMax)
Range of Values for Task 1 Runtime
29 ms–43 ms
(task1RuntimeMin–task1RuntimeMax)
Input Parameters for Links
Actual ZigBee Delivery Time for an oppnet
Control Message
4.928
(actualZigBeeDelTimeCtrlMsg)
Actual ZigBee Delivery Time of a help object
message Containing helpObject
34.84
(actualZigBeeDelTimeHelpObjectMsg)
Actual BT Delivery Time of an Oppnet Control
Message
0.383
(actualBTDelTimeCtrlMsg)
Actual BT Delivery Time of a Help Object
Message Containing helpObject
2.582
(actualBTDelTimeHelpObjectMsg)
Actual Wi-Fi Delivery Time of an Oppnet
Control Message
0.0164
(actualBTDelTimeCtrlMsg)
Actual Wi-Fi Delivery Time of a Help Object
Message Containing helpObject
0.7696
(actualWiFiDelTimeHelpObjectMsg)
Actual Cellular Delivery Time of an SMS
Containing helpTextMsg
4060 ms
(actualCellDelTimeHelpTextMsg)

Cf. No. 2 in Table 5.4

Cf. No. 2 in Table 5.4

Cf. No. 2 in Table 5.6

Cf. No. 1 in Table 5.5

Cf. No. 1 in Table 5.5

Cf. No. 2 in Table 5.5

Cf. No. 2 in Table 5.5

Cf. No. 3 in Table 5.5

Cf. No. 3 in Table 5.5

Cf. No. 4 in Table 5.5

5.5. Simulation Measures
Table 5.7 describes measures used in the baseline simulation (MicroOppnet v.5.2), divided
into four categories. Description and calculation steps for obtaining these measures are also
included in this table. Please note that these measures differ from the ones used by Alduailij
[Aldu15]. This is due to the fact that her measures were defined not for a pure simulation but for
a combined emulation/simulation.
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Table 5.7. Simulation measures.
No.

Measure

Description

Success Rate: The average of the success number for achieving oppnet goal
1A

Success Rate
(successRate)

Success Rate for Achieving Oppnet Goal in different simulation area
sizes (e.g., 300x300, 400x400, 500x500, 600x600).
Please note that a simulation iteration is successful when the oppnet
goal is achieved, which in this case is delivering helpObject to 9-1-1
(via SMS or by calling).
We calculate this measure in the following steps:
1) Measuring the number of successful simulation iterations (ssi).
2) Measuring the total number of simulation iterations (tsi).
3) At the end, divide the total number of successful simulation
iterations (ssi) calculated in Step 1 by the total number of
simulation iterations (tsi) using the following formula:
successRate = ssi/tsi
1B
Failure Ratio
We calculate this measure in the following steps:
(failureRate) 1) Measuring the number of failure simulation iterations (fsi).
2) Measuring the total number of simulation iterations (tsi).
3) At the end, divide the total number of failure simulation iterations
(fsi)calculated in Step 1 by the total number of simulation
iterations (tsi) calculated in Step 2, using the following
formula: successRate = fsi/tsi
Average Time: The total time to succeed (deliver the message from sender node to the target
node)
2A
Average Time
Time delay/time taken at source interface to encapsulate packet +
(averageTime) delay/time taken in travelling over media towards destination +
delay/time taken to open that packet at receiver end
Impact of increasing number of target nodes on the success rates for the baseline system:
The target node is any oppnet-enabled device that using the mobile phone technology (not just a
cellphone device).
3A
Success Rate
We believe that increasing the number of target nodes (in a given
(successRate) area) increases the success rates to reach the oppnet goal
3B
Average Time
We believe that increasing the number of target nodes (in a given
(averageTime) area) reduces the average time required to succeed the oppnet goal
Impact of increasing the ratio of oppnet-enabled potential helpers on the success rates for the
baseline system:
4A
Success Rate
We believe that increasing the ratio of oppnet-enabled PHs (in a given
(successRate) area) increases the success rates to reach the oppnet goal
4B
Average Time
We believe that increasing the the ratio of oppnet-enabled potential
(averageTime) helpers (in a given area) increases the average time required to
succeed the oppnet goal at the same area
Table Notes:
1) A simulation iteration is successful when the oppnet goal is achieved, which in this case is delivering
helpObject to 9-1-1 via SMS.
2) Oppnet may fail to succeed in achieving its goal for the following reasons:
a) The number of helpers is not sufficient (i.e., too few and/or scattered in “unreachable” locations within
the simulation area), which causes interruptions in receiving or forwarding the message or a scarce of
applications and resources to achieve the task.
b) The number of helpers is sufficient but the helpers are grouped too close to each other but either far from
the seed, or another relay node, which causes the message to be interrupted
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5.6. Experimental Setup
Our simulation experiments are conducted to compare the baseline system and the proposed
SP2O system. The simulation is written C# language in the IDE environment. It runs on Intel Core
i7, 250 GHz processor with 16 GB RAM.
We conducted a series of experiments to compare the baseline system with the SP2O system,
presented in the next Chapter. For statistical validity, the reported results are based on averaging
of data collected over 1000 simulation iterations. This number of runs has been chosen arbitrarily
but with the assurance that the number is sufficient for the results to become stable.
We present and discuss the experimental results in the next chapter.

5.7. Challenges and Limitations of the Baseline System
The baseline system is simulated because we need a yardstick to which we can compare the
system SP2O we proposed next (in Chapter 6).
The baseline system includes no facilities to deal with security and privacy threats. These
security threats and privacy are still major challenges that are not addressed by the baseline system.
Providing system components that protect security and privacy is the key motivation behind this
Dissertation. The proposed system, called Secure Privacy-Preserving Oppnet (SP2O), is discussed
in the next chapter.

5.8. Chapter Conclusions
This chapter presented the simulation design for the baseline system. After describing the
simulation scenario for MicroOppnet v.5.2, it discussed simulation assumptions (including general
assumptions, helper-related assumptions, message-related assumptions, and technology-related
assumptions), simulation input parameters, simulation measures, and experimental setup.
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CHAPTER 6

DESIGN OF THE PROPOSED SP2O SYSTEM AND
ITS SIMULATION

6.1. Introduction
In this chapter we present an architecture for the proposed SP2O system and our simulation
design for this system. Discussion of the architecture includes presenting the developed helper
lifecycle state diagram, the enhanced set of OVM primitives, the PTF-based Oppnets Architecture
(POA), the ADB-based Oppnet Scheme (AOS), and integration of POA and AOS into the
proposed SP2O system.
The simulation design of the proposed SP2O system includes simulation scenario,
assumptions, input parameters, measures, and the simulation setup.

6.2. Architecture for the Proposed SP2O System
In this section, we present the helper lifecycle state diagram, an enhanced set of OVM
primitives, and propose a Secure Privacy-Preserving Oppnet (SP2O) Architecture, which includes
two smaller systems: PTF-based Oppnets Architecture (POA) and ADB-based Oppnet Scheme
(AOS). The proposed SP2O system integrates the POA and AOS systems. POA ensures secure
interactions between various oppnet entities in the face of its ad hoc growth. AOS protects sensitive
data exchanged among all entities of an oppnet during its entire lifecycle. We believe that SP2O
system meets most of the oppnet requirements in terms of security and privacy.
We simulate SP2O including POA but not AOS. The latter exceeded the scope of this
dissertation work.
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6.2.1. Helper Lifecycle State Diagram for the Proposed System
Decentralized Oppnet Controller controls all activities and states of each helper. Each
helper follows its lifecycle state diagram.
The state diagram for the lifecycle of a single oppnet helper is composed of 8 states with
the total of 13 transitions between the states, as shown in Fig. 6.1. When a potential helper is
scanned and then discovered by a seed node or another node looking for a helper, State A (the
initial state of the state diagram) is entered.

Figure 6.1. The proposed eight-state diagram for an oppnet helper [cf. AASL18].
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The eight-states of a single oppnet helper, identified in the state diagram, are:
State A: Potential Helper—any oppnet-enabled device is considered as a potential helper. (A
device can become oppnet-enabled by installation a few of OVM primitives.). Here, the potential
helper is the first state of oppnet helper lifecycle. It results in a scan and discover process
(transition) that identifies potential devices that may serve as a future candidate helper.
State B: Discovered Helper—this state is the output from the previous stage, which includes
discovered candidate helpers, invite or call to assist oppnet in completing its work.
State C: Candidate Helper—this includes any device(s) that are elected as a helper that can
perform oppnet related tasks. Here the output from this state, which includes candidate helpers,
undergoes a series of verification process (including our scope of security and privacy issues). This
will be further explored in Task 2.
State D: Verified Helper—this corresponds to a verification process of the candidate helper. In
this stage of the helper lifecycle, the candidate helper either passes the verification process and is
accepted (selected) or rejected and this helper assume a future potential helper.
State E: Accepted Evaluated Helper—in this state, an evaluation of the helper capabilities is
carried out. Here if the helper is assessed to have adequate capabilities to perform the tasks under
hand, it will be admitted to a pool of verified and capable helpers. Otherwise the device is
considered a future potential helper (to save time and do not to reserve a helper without benefiting
from its use).
State F: Admitted Helper—at this stage, the actual helper is safely integrated with oppnet
resources. Also, task assignment is deployed to the helpers at this stage too.
State G: Busy Helper (a.k.a. Actual-Busy Helper)—This state involves the actual implementation
process of the task and this is correlated with the overall task the oppnet is used for. As the helper
finishes (or completes) the task(s), if another duty within the current oppnet application requires
(needs) to keep this helper, then the current helper will assume an idle status.
State H: Idle Helper. (a.k.a. Actual-Idle Helper)—the helper assumes this state, which serves as a
standby for any other task related to the present oppnet application (in this case keep it into
admitted helper pool, else will release it).
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6.2.2. Enhanced set of OVM Primitives
Here we present a secure and privacy-preserving set of OVMPs as listed in Table 6.1. These
updated set of OVMPs are mainly base the original and developed set of OVMPs (third-generation
OVM primitives) [LiKG06, LKBG06, KGLY07, KLGY08, LGKY10].
Table 6.1. Partial list of the proposed OVM primitives for the oppnet nodes.
No

a

Primitive Function

Primitive Name

1

NODE_initiateTv

2

NODE_reqTv

3

NODE_getTv

4

NODE_updateTv

5

NODE_createADB

6

NODE_disseminateADB

7

NODE_enableADB

Set an initial trust value to a candidate helper
if it does not own a Tv
Request trust value (Tv) from a candidate
helper
Receive or get required trust value (Tv) of a
candidate helper
Update trust value (either increase Tv or
decrease Tv) of a candidate helper
Create an Oppnet-ADB of sensitive Oppnet
data for the seed oppnet node
Disseminate (send) an Oppnet-ADB which
includes sensitive Oppnet data to another
helper
Enable an Oppnet-ADB in a receiving
(authorized) oppnet helper

Implementing
Nodesa
S, H, L
S, H, L
S, H, L
S, H, L
S, H, L
S, H, L
S, H, L

C: control center, H: helper, L: lite helper, S: seed.

6.2.3. PTF-Based Oppnet Architecture (POA)
This section presents the proposed security architecture for oppnets, called PTF-based Oppnet
architecture (POA), is based on the state diagram for a single oppnet helper, shown in Fig. 8.1.
POA integrates PTF into the oppnet structure and operations, placing it under the control of
Oppnet’s supervisor, previously called the Decentralized Command Center (CC) and now renamed
as Decentralized Oppnet Controller (DOC)20 [AASL18]. PTF underlies all security and privacy
services in its oppnet performed during its entire lifetime. Among others, PTF-based services

20

Renaming is due to the fact that its work is not limited to being a distributed command center, but also controls and
supervises all oppnet operations.
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ensure secure data transmissions among oppnet entities, verifying that a helper joining an oppnet
is not malicious, and assures that data transmitted among oppnet entities in a secure manner.

6.2.3.1. POA Structure
The POA structure for a seed oppnet and for an expanded oppnet are shown in Fig. 6.2.21 The
PTF is integrated into the oppnet structure and operations to ensure security and privacy-preserving
oppnet interaction [AASL18]. The DOC and PTF are briefly described below.
Decentralized Oppnet controller (DOC): It is a decentralized software that controls all oppnet’s
interactions and activities. DOC has the following beneficial properties for oppnets:
1) Controls all oppnet operations.
2) Makes decisions to grow an oppnet by admitting other new nodes, or to shrink by releasing or
removing nodes (expelling malicious nodes).
3) Monitors collaborative processing.
4) Supervises and monitors PTF processing.
5) Detects suspicious behaviors of oppnet entities based on the feedback from collaborative and
PTF processing. DOC constitutes the second line of defense in detecting insider attacks.

Seed Oppnet
SN 1

SN 2

Expanded Oppnet
SN n

SN 1

SN 1

SN 1

H1

H2

Decentralized Oppnet Controller (DOC)

Decentralized Oppnet Controller (DOC)

Other Components

Other Components

Pervasive Trust Foundation (PTF)
(SSs)

Pervasive Trust Foundation (PTF)
(SSs)

(a) Seed Oppnet

Hm

( b) Expanded Oppnet

Figure 6.2. Basic POA structure [cf. AASL18].
21

Some components (identified as “Other Components” in Figure 6.3) are not shown in detail due to not being
critical for understanding the POA structure.
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Pervasive Trust Foundation (PTF): The PTF implements the trust foundation for security and
privacy in oppnets. It is envisioned as a basis for all interactions among oppnet entities. Whenever
an entity interacts with other entities, trust is considered either explicitly (in large-scale or open
oppnet applications) or implicitly (in small and closed oppnet applications).
Trust processing in PTF requires a decentralized approach to process (calculate, update, and
store) trust values for a multitude of heterogeneous oppnet or oppnet-enabled entities. In addition,
PTF adds the following benefits to oppnets:
1) Supports security and privacy services that constitute the first line of defense against
insider/outsider attacks.
2) Supports security and privacy services that perform helper verification (including
authentication, authorization, and checking fo r a sufficient trust level) to ensure that a helper
joining an oppnet is not malicious.
3) Supports secure interactions among oppnet entities during a continuous expansion.
4) Supports security and privacy services that ensure secure and privacy-preserving data
transmissions among oppnet entities.
5) Provides support for boosting DOC performance.

6.2.3.2. POA Operations
The basic POA operations are shown in Fig. 5. The solid-line arrows indicate control flow
between architecture blocks, and broken-line arrows indicate data flow. Additionally, the
uppercase letters (A to H) indicate the current helper state (as identified in Fig. 6.1) for helpers
being processed. For example, before entering the block of Discover Candidate Helpers, a helper
is in State A (Potential Helper in Fig.6.1); when a helper leaves this block, it is in State B
(Discovered Helper).
DOC controls every single block in Fig. 5, but control interactions by DOC are not shown to
avoid overcrowding this figure with lines and arrows. The four major activities controlled by DOC
are: (1) oppnet growth; (2) collaborative processing; (3) PTF processing; and (4) terminating
oppnet work. These activities are described in turn.
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Oppnet Growth. When an oppnet needs to grow into a bigger one, it initiates the oppnet
growth process, which assures security by admitting helpers only after verifying them by security
services (e.g., authentication) supported by PTF.
1) Discover Candidate Helpers: This step performs two major functions. First, it scans within its
range for potential helpers. Second, it identifies a subset of a potential helper that it wishes to
invite. These helpers become candidate helpers.
2) Invite Candidate Helpers: Oppnet invites (or “orders” in some situations, e.g. life-or-death
circumstances) selected candidate helpers to join oppnet to help it in a specific job. An invited
candidate helper replies to this invitation with either Accept or Reject. A candidate helper that
replies Accept expresses an obligation to keep on helping the inviting oppnet as long as the
oppnet needs it. (An invited candidate helper can reply Reject for any reason; a candidate
helper ordered to join is obliged to keep helping the inviting oppnet till released by it.)
3) Verify Candidate Helpers: DOC performs a series of security and privacy verifications. These
verifications include authentication, authorization, access control, and checking integrity. In
performing all verifications DOC relies on security and privacy services supported by PTF.
The candidate helpers that pass all verifications become verified helpers.
4) Accept Helpers: DOC selects from the set of verified helpers the ones possessing the best
capabilities for the tasks to be given to them by the oppnet. The selected verified helpers
become accepted helpers.
5) Enough Evaluated Helpers?: DOC decides whether its oppnet has a sufficient number of
helpers (including just accepted helpers as well as the ones accepted in earlier growth
iterations). Please note that in Fig. 3 there is no state corresponding to the Enough Evaluated
Helpers? block. The reason is that this block is related to a set of helpers while the helper state
diagram is for a single helper.
6) Admit Selected Helpers: All accepted helpers are admitted into oppnet, becoming admitted
helpers.
7) Assign Tasks to Helpers: All newly admitted helpers receive their tasks, in this way helping
their oppnet (in the process integrating their resources with other resources of their oppnet).
They become busy helpers.
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8) Keep Idle Helper: A helper completing its tasks becomes an idle helper. It can be released by
DOC, or—if it might be needed for executing other tasks—returned to the pool holding also
newly admitted helpers.
Start

Deploy Seed Oppnet

Need to grow?
No

Yes
Oppnet
Growth

Decentralized
Oppnet Controller (DOC)

A

Discover Candidate Helpers
PTF Processing

B

Trust Computing

Invite Candidate Helpers

Feedback

Req.
Tv (H)

Trust Database
Unit

Verify Candidate Helpers
D

Yes

Resp.
Tv (H)

No

Accept Helpers

Trust Update
Unit

Enough Helpers?

Trust Calculation
Unit

Yes

E

No

Trust Management &
Monitoring

C

Initiation

Admit Selected Helpers

Feedback
Collaborative Processing

F
Assign Tasks to Helpers

Busy Helper Tasks Done

G

Need Helper?
Keep Idle Helper
Yes

H

No

Oppnet Work Done?
Terminating
Oppnet Work

Yes

No

Stop

Figure 6.3. Basic POA structure [AASL18].
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Collaborative Processing. All admitted helpers perform their assigned tasks in a collaborative
manner. DOC manages helpers’ statuses; monitors their behavior and performance; and provides
to the PTF its trust-related feedback about them. DOC makes decisions whether to release a given
helper or return it to the pool of admitted helpers (to use them for more tasks in the future).
If during oppnet job execution any oppnet node expresses a need for inviting more helpers, DOC
performs another iteration of the Oppnet Growth procedure. When oppnet completes its entire job,
DOC releases all helpers.
PTF Processing. As indicated in Fig. 5, PTF gets from cooperative processing a feedback about
the performance of admitted helpers (busy and idle). It uses this feedback to calculate trust values
for each helper. PTF consists of the following components, shown in Fig. 5:
1) (Initial) Trust Calculation: We have subcases here. First, when there is neither direct nor
indirect (reputation) evidence available for an Oppnet Entity E (e.g., a helper was just admitted
and no oppnet entity has any trust information about it), PTF assigns a default initial trust value
for Entity E. Second, when there is only indirect (reputation) evidence available for an Oppnet
Entity E (e.g., a helper was just admitted but DOC happens to have reputation information
about it), PTF calculates an initial trust value for Entity E based on indirect evidence.
2) Trust Update: Any oppnet entity must possess a trust value before it can interact with any other
entity. If it does not, it receives an initial trust value as explained above. The current (starting
with the initial) trust value for Entity E evolves over time as new evidence is collected during
interactions of other oppnet entities with Entity E. The new evidence (both direct and indirect)
is used to update the trust value for Entity E.
3) Trust Database: Trust Database stores all trust values for all oppnet entities. It also stores at
least one previous trust value for each entity (if useful for analysis, might even store the whole
history of trust changes). We propose using a relational database with tuples including
attributes such as entity ID, its trust value, and identification of the tasks that affected the
current trust value.
Terminating Oppnet Work. When the whole oppnet job is completed, DOC releases all helpers.
Instead of purging from the Trust Database all information about released helpers, DOC might
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keep some or all of it for a possible future use (in case the same entity is a potential helper for
future runs of the oppnet).

6.2.4. ADB-based Oppnet Scheme (AOS)
Based on the Active Data Bundle (ADB) scheme [BeLi08, BeLi09], we propose utilizing the
concept of privacy-preserving scheme for protecting sensitive oppnet data. This proposed solution
called ADB-based Oppnet Scheme (AOS). We believe that there are two main goals of using AOS
for oppnets: (1) protecting sensitive oppnet data from disclosures by unauthorized outsiders or by
insiders, and (2) limiting insiders’ access to sensitive data based on. The AOS will work under the
control of oppnet’s DOC. We must employ lightweight mechanisms of ADBs to meet the real time
constraints for of Oppnet-enabled entities. This part of our proposed solution is still under
investigation in the future work due to constraint time.

6.2.4.1. AOS Structure
By adding here some new information and concepts to what was already written (in Chapter
1) about ADBs [BeLi08, BeLi09], we can describe the three main components for use of ADBs in
oppnets as follows:
1. Sensitive Oppnet Data (SOD): It is information that needs to be protected from unauthorized
access to safeguard the security or privacy of an individual or organization. It can include any
digital content such as documents, code, images, audio, video etc. There are different sensitivity
levels for data based on specific factors that make them sensitive; for instance, data may be
inherently sensitive, come from a sensitive source, be declared sensitive, be a part of a sensitive
attribute, be sensitive in relation to previously disclosed information, etc. [PfPf07]. Sensitive
data lifecycle includes creating data (by an owner or a creator acting on his behalf),
disseminating data, disclosing data (full, partial, or null), and destroying data (at the end of
data lifetime).
2. Oppnet Metadata (OMD): It describes all privacy policies required to control ADB behavior
and operations (when enforced by the virtual machine). This means that metadata contains
information describing sensitive data and prescribing its use. They include access policies for
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the sensitive data. Metadata include, among others, the following categories of privacy policies
[AlAL16]:
a) Operational policies control ADB behavior during its lifecycle from creation to
destruction.
b) Trust verification policies verify that the trust level of the host to be visited is sufficiently
high to allow their ADB for actually visit the host.
c) Integrity verification policies verify the integrity of ADB components (data, metadata with
policies, and the VM with code).
d) Access control policies control data disseminations and data disclosures. The former
requires specifying who can disseminate the ADB that contains them, and under what
conditions. The latter provide conditions upon which their ADB may disclose specific data
to specific hosts.
e) Application-Dependent policies specify different policies for different applications; this
includes the case when the same data are used by different applications.
3. ADB-based Oppnet Virtual Machine (ADB-OVM): It is a program designed to enforce all
policies defined within ADB metadata (and, possibly, rules within the VM code as well). VM
performs all major ADB activities which enforces policies specified in metadata, including
controlling operational policies, evaluating trust verification policies, checking integrity
verification policies, enforcing access control policies, and other VM activities.

6.2.4.2. AOS Operations
The VM makes its ADB active by executing the following main functions and operations
[AlAL16]:
1. Controlling operational policies that manage the ADB behavior during its lifecycle.
2. Performing the following data-protecting ADB’s operations [BenO10]:
a) Evaporation—the process of destroying this part of ADB data that the host (helper or
malicious candidate helper) is not allowed to access (due to the insufficient trust level of
the host, and the conditions specified by ADB policies).
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b) Apoptosis—the process of a complete self-destruction of an ADB when it’s VM realizes
that privacy of the ADB is about to be compromised (e.g., based on the trust level of the
host (malicious or candidate helper) to be visited or due to ADB policies). Also, if the ADB
has disclosed data to the host and has no more hosts to visit, its VM apoptosizes it.
3. Evaluating trust verification policies to assure ADB protection from unauthorized receiving
hosts. It involves checking trust value of the visited host and comparing with ADB’s trust
threshold.22 If the trust value is lower than the threshold, the VM performs apoptosis.
Otherwise, the VM authorizes disclosing data to the host. (More specifically, the VM
authorizes disclosing data to one or more applications running on the host, at the disclosure
levels appropriate for each of these applications.)
4. Checking integrity verification policies to assure ADB integrity. It involves VM calculating the
hash value for the ADB at the visited host. If it is different than the hash value ATT-HV (stored
within ADB metadata), the VM apoptosizes the ADB. Otherwise, the VM proceeds to the
following step.
5. Enforcing access control policies to determine the extent of data disclosure. The VM evaluates
policies P for data delivered to Host H, and—as determined by this evaluation—performs an
appropriate data disclosure:
a) Full data disclosure—permitting disclosure of all ADB data;
b) Partial data disclosure—permitting disclosure of a part of ADB data;
c) Null data disclosure—preventing disclosure of any of ADB data.
Before data are handed to H and applications, VM decrypts them.
6. Applying application-dependent policies to facilitate delivering data to a requesting
application.

22

A trust threshold shows the minimum trust value that an ADB requires for a host to disclose any data at the host (to
any application residing at the host).
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6.2.5. Operations of the Proposed SP2O System
The SP2O operations, using an enhanced set of OVM primitives, to admit a single oppnet
helper are shown in Fig. 6.4 and Fig. 6.5. The OVM primitives are numbered to identify the
sequence of the SP2O operations. We skip here the detailed descriptions of the execution flow
shown in the figures because it is analogous to the explanation for the baseline system (Section
4.3.4).
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Figure 6.4. The SP2O operations at an admitted (authorized) helper.
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Figure 6.5. The SP2O operations at a malicious (unauthorized) helper.
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6.3. Simulation Design for the Proposed SP2O System
For readers' convenience, this section includes description of the simulation design of the
baseline system (MicroOppnet v.5.2) copied from Chapter 5.
Much of the text of this section is analogous to the corresponding section of the previous
Chapter. In some cases, we omit text that is a copy of the text from the previous chapter.

6.3.1. Simulation Scenario for the Proposed SP2O System
The scenario for the proposed SP2O system is analogous for the scenario of the baseline system
(as presented Section 5.1). In particular, SP2O succeeds when the oppnet reaches the Target Node
(capable to contact 9-1-1).
This scenario involves no security and privacy attacks, even though SP2O is designed to handle
such attacks. Our scenario of the baseline system and SP2O systems shows the overhead that SP2O
incurs to be ready for handling the security and privacy attacks. Using an analogy, the baseline
system is like an uninsured homeowner and SP2O is like an insured homeowner. When everything
goes well (no attacks on the system, no flooding on the home) the baseline system (the uninsured
homeowner) have advantage over SP2O (the insured homeowner), e.g., using fewer resources or
saving some money.
In the future, simulation of attacks on the baseline system and SP2O systems needs to be run.
This will show that the advantage of the proposed SP2O system or the insured homeowner over
the baseline system or the uninsured homeowner (being able to resist attacks or getting insurance
after flooding).
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6.3.2. Simulation Assumptions for the Proposed SP2O System
The proposed SP2O system used all assumptions for the baseline system. In addition, due to
having additional comports, it adds the following assumptions:
1) The seed oppnet is trusted, and all other potential helpers PHs including the target node must
have their Trust Value (Tv) compared to the Trust Threshold.
2) The Trust Threshold value to admit a candidate helper into the oppnet is 70
(TRUST_THRESHOLD = 70).
3) The ratio of trusted to all potential helpers PHs is 90%.

6.3.3. Simulation Input Parameters for the Proposed SP2O System
The list of input parameters for the proposed SP2O system is analogous to the list of input
parameters for the baseline system (presented in Chapter 5). However, the values for most of these
parameters are same except for the parameter values that need extra time delay to calculate trust
values. Some of these values are calculated in a way analogous to the calculation for the
corresponding values for the baseline system.
However, now analogously to Formula 1 in Subsection 5.3.3.3, we can calculate message
payload reading times of the Trust Values for the used technologies and devices (in a way
analogous to the calculation for the corresponding values for the baseline system), as summarized
in Table 6.2.
For example, to calculate reading time (execution time) for Trust Value (Tv message payload)
by a Tablet (Row 1 in Table 6.2), the following calculations are performed, using the fact that
Tablet is Nexus 9, with a 2.3 GHz processor:
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IC for reading Tv = (size of Tv [B]23) * (IC per byte of transferred data [50 instr./B]24)
= 8 B * 225 * 50 instr./B = 800 instr.
T = (CPI * IC) / PF =
= (1 [1/instr.] * 800 instr.) / 2.3 GHz = 800 / 2.3 * 10^9 [1/s]
= 0.482 × 10-3 ms

Analogously, we can calculate reading times (execution times) of the Trust Values for other
used technologies and devices (Rows 2-7 in Table 6.2).
In addition, we consider an extra time delay due to maintain and using PTF in the proposed
SP2O system. As an example, calculation of Trust Value (Tv) of Actual ZigBee Delivery Time
for an Oppnet Control Message or ZIGBEE_TRUST_MSG_DELIVERY (Row 8 in Table 6.2)
follows:
We assume that we need 8 Byte to represent an encrypted Trust Value (Tv) of a given oppnet
helper. Here, we also recall the way that used to calculate delivery time for messages sent via
ZigBee and its assumptions presented in item A of 5.2.5.1, as well as based on Formulas 2 and 3
in Subsection 5.2.5.1. Therefore, to deliver a help control message containing Trust value (Tv) of
size 8 B, we need 1 packet with maximum payload 72 B and 13 B header with 56 B payload size
and 250 Kbps data rate.
Thus, ZigBee delivery time [ms] for the Tv message can be calculated as:
= ((8 B header + 13 B) × 8 b/B) / (250 Kbps × 103) ≈ 0.672 ms
Analogously, we calculate delivery times for other oppnet control messages containing Trust
value (Tv) related to other communication technologies (BT, Wi-Fi, and Cellular) used in the
proposed SP2O system. Rows 9-11 in Table 6.2 describe input parameters and their value ranges.

23
24
25

Assume that 8 Byte is the size of Trust Value.
Assume that each 1 Byte requires 50 instr. for processing time of an encrypted Trust Value.
Reading 1 B of data requires 1 LDRB instruction and 1 STRB instruction. LDRB is a data transfer instruction used to load a byte
of data from memory to a CPU register for reading. STRB is a data transfer instruction (following LDRB) to transfer a byte of
data from a CPU register back to memory.
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Table 6.2. Input parameters for the SP2O system [cf. Aldu15].
No.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

Value
Range [ms]
Input Parameters for Individual Oppnet Nodes
Message Payload Reading Time for Tablet (Nexus
9, 2.3 GHz)
0.482×10-3
(TABLET_TRUST_VALUE_UPATE_OVERHEAD)
Approximate Message Payload Reading Time for
Digital TV (Samsung 2013, 1.35 GHz)
0.5×10-3
(TV_TRUST_VALUE_UPATE_OVERHEAD)
Message Payload Reading Time for Smartphone
(Nexus 5, 2.26 GHz)
0.353×10-3
(SMARTPHONE_TRUST_VALUE_UPATE_OVERHEAD)
Message Payload Reading Time for DB Server
(HP ProLiant DL560 Gen8, 2.2 GHz)
0.363×10-3
(DB_TRUST_VALUE_UPATE_OVERHEAD)
Message Payload Reading Time for Printer (HP
Officejet Pro 8630, 600 MHz)
1.50×10-3
(PRINTER_TRUST_VALUE_UPATE_OVERHEAD)
Range of Values for Message Payload Reading
Time for ParkingMeter, Streetlight, etc.
15 – 22
(PARKINGMETER_TV_MIN_OVERHEAD –
PARKINGMETER_TV_MAX_OVERHEAD)
Range of Values for Message Payload Reading
Time for Seed Nodes (Wristband)
15 – 22
(WRISTBANDS_TRUST_VALUE_MIN_OVERHEAD–
WRISTBANDS_TRUST_VALUE_MAX_OVERHEAD)
Input Parameters for Links
ZigBee Delivery Time of an Oppnet Control
Message Containing trustValue
0.672
(ZIGBEE_TRUST_MSG_DELIVERY)
BT Delivery Time of an Oppnet Task Message
Containing trustValue
0.0633
(BT_TRUST_MSG_DELIVERY)
Wi-Fi Delivery Time of an Oppnet Control
Message Containing trustValue
0.032
(WIFI_TRUST_MSG_DELIVERY)
Cellular Delivery Time of an SMS Containing
helpObject
4060
(Cellular_DATA_MSG_DELIVERY)
Parameter
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Description

See discussions in
Subsection 6.3.3
See discussions in
Subsection 6.3.3
See discussions in
Subsection 6.3.3
See discussions in
Subsection 6.3.3
See discussions in
Subsection 6.3.3
See discussions in
Subsection 6.3.3

See discussions in
Subsection 6.3.3

See calculations in
Subsection 6.3.3
See calculations in
Subsection 6.3.3
See calculations in
Subsection 6.3.3
See calculations in
Subsection 6.3.3

6.3.4. Simulation Measures
Simulation measures for the proposed SP2O system are the same as for the baseline system (as
shown in Table 5.7 in the previous chapter).

6.3.5. Experimental Simulation Setup
Simulation setup for the proposed SP2O system is the same as for the baseline system (as
shown in Section 5.5).

6.4. Chapter Conclusions
This chapter discussed the design of the proposed SP2O system and its simulation. SP2O
includes two subsystems: PTF-based Oppnets Architecture (POA) and ADB-based Oppnet
Scheme (AOS). POA ensures secure interactions between various oppnet entities in the face of its
ad hoc growth. AOS protects privacy of sensitive data exchanged among oppnet entities during its
entire lifecycle.
SP2O simulation excludes AOS due to our time limitations. The description of the simulation
included its scenario, assumptions, input parameters, measures and setup.
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CHAPTER 7

PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

7.1. Introduction
In this chapter we discuss performance evaluation (via simulation) for both the baseline system
and the proposed SP2O system and compare these systems. The comparison shows the overhead
of the proposed SP2O system compared to the baseline system. This SP2O overhead is analogous
to an overhead of an insured homeowner (analogy to SP2O) compared to an uninsured homeowner
(analogy to the baseline system).

7.2. Simulation Results and Their Discussions
In this section we present simulation results for the baseline system and the proposed SP2O
system. This includes simulation results in terms of success rates,26 average times to succeed, the
impact of increasing the number of target nodes on success rates, the impact of increasing the
number of target nodes on average times to succeed, the impact of increasing the ratio of the
oppnet-enabled potential helpers on the success rates, and the impact of increasing the ratio of
oppnet-enabled potential helpers on average times to succeed.
Samples of a simulation outputs for both the baseline system and the proposed SP2O system
are included in Appendix B.

26

Recall that an oppnet, either the baseline system or the proposed system succeeds when Target Node (capable of
contacting 9-1-1) is reached.
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7.2.1.

Special Simulation Results

This subsection presents the saturation effect for success rates with respect to the maximum
number of invited potential helpers per node, and the number of levels required to succeed with
respect to the size of an oppnet operation area.

7.2.1.1. The Saturation Effect for Success Rates w.r.t Number of Invited
Potential Helpers
Fig. 7.1 shows that the success rates for all area sizes increase with the number of potential
helpers (PHs), in which the node can invite, of 1 through 7. At PH 7, the oppnet reaches the
saturation point. For example, increasing the number of invited PHs from 7 to 20 or even more
does not increase the success rates due to the saturation.
The graph in Fig. 7.1 demonstrates that for the best oppnet performance in terms of success
rates, each node can invite 1 to 7 PHs in the proposed L2 helper selection method. Increasing the
number of invited PHs requires time and resources consumptions without a benefit in success rates.
This means the proposed method assures the minimum use of oppnet resources with the maximum
success rates. Hence, the proposed method is efficient, and supports our hypothesis.

108

Success Rate vs. Maximum Number of Invited PHs Per Oppnet Node
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Figure 7.1. Success rates with oppnet growth saturation w.r.t. the maximum number of
invited PHs per node (using 100 PHs, and a single Target Node).

7.2.1.2. Number of Levels Required to Succeed w.r.t. Area Size for Oppnet
Growth
Fig. 7.2 shows that the number of levels required to succeed to reach the Target Node, increases
linearly with the area size for area size of 300 through 1000. However, for the small area sizes of
200 to 300, the number of levels stays stable.
Since the Target Node is always located at the last level from the seed, based on this
assumption, increasing the area size incurs a greater number of levels to reach that goal. These
results demonstrate that the number of levels required to reach the oppnet goal is proportional with
area size. This means that the proposed L2 method is scalable in terms of the area size and supports
our hypothesis.
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Number of Levels vs. Area Size
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Figure 7.2. Number of levels required to succeed with increasing the size of areas
(using 90 PHs, and 1, 2, 3, 4 Target Nodes).

7.2.2.

Success Rates

This subsection presents the success rate results for the baseline system and the proposed SP2O
system, and the compares them.

7.2.2.1. Success Rate of the Baseline System
Fig. 7.3 depicts that the success rates for all area network sizes increases with the number of
potential helpers (PHs) but shows a saturation effect (the saturation effect is not visible in Fig. 7.3
for the two largest areas because the number of PHs is limited to 100; we believe that it would
become visible if a larger number of PHs were considered). For the smallest area (300x300), the
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success rates increase linearly with the number of PHs of 10 to 30, and then start to saturate. The
curves for the larger areas increase initially less than linear, then linearly, and finally start to
saturate. For example, for the largest area (600x600), the success rates for PHs of 10 to 30 are 0;
then the success rates increase initially less than linearly for PHs of 30 to 50; and more than linearly
for PHs of 50 to 90; and finally start to saturate for PHs of 90 to 100, and so almost to other areas
(300x300, 400x400, and 500x500).
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Figure 7.3. Success rates for achieving the oppnet goal vs. the number of PHs for the
baseline system (using different area sizes and single Target Node).
We observe that for a given number of PHs, the success rates have the highest value for the
smallest area and start decreases with increasing the area size. This is because for the small area,
the PHs density is high and hence the distance between each pair of PHs is short. This increases
the probability of connections between the oppnet node and the PHs. Therefore, more PHs are
expected to join and hence the success rate is expected to be higher. For instance, with 10 PHs, the
success rate for the smallest area (300x300) is 9% while for the largest area (600x600) it is 0%.
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7.2.2.2. Success Rate of the Proposed SP2O System
Fig. 7.4 depicts that the success rates for all area sizes increase with the number of PHs but
show a saturation effect. For the smallest area (300x300), the success rates increase linearly with
the number of PHs of 10 to 30 and then start to saturate. Therefore, the curves for the larger areas
increase initially less than linear, then linearly, and finally start to saturate.
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Figure 7.4. Success rates for achieving the oppnet goal vs. the number of PHs for the
proposed SP2O system (using different area sizes and single Target Node).
We observe that the values of the success rates of the proposed SP2O system are relatively
lower than the baseline system but are increasing analogously to the baseline system. For example,
with 10 PHs, the success rate for the smallest area (300x300) is 7% while for the largest area
(600x600) it is 0%.
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7.2.2.3. Comparison and Success Rate Overhead
Fig. 7.5 compares the success rates for the baseline system (broken lines) and the proposed
SP2O system (solid lines). It combines Figures 7.3 and 7.4 to facilitate their comparison.
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Figure 7.5. Comparison of success rates for achieving the oppnet goal between the baseline
system and the proposed SP2O system.
Fig.7.6. describes success rate overhead for the proposed SP2O system vs. the baseline system.
Compared to the baseline system, SP2O introduces the average success rate overhead 15% for the
300x300 area27, 17% for the 400x400 area, 22% for the 500x500 area, and 26% for the 600x600
area.

27

As an example, the success rate overhead for the 300x300 area (in Fig. 7.6) is calculated as follows: (a) the success
rate overhead for 10 PHs is (9-7) / 9 = 22% (cf. Figure 7.5); (b) the success rate overheads for 20-100 PHs are
calculated analogously as in Step a; (c) the average success rate overhead for the 300x300 area across all PHs is (22%
+ 24% + 20% + ... + 11%) / 10 = 15%. The success rate overheads for other areas (400x400, 500x500, and 600x600)
are calculated analogously.
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Therefore, the overall average success rate overhead for all areas is 20%28. It is the cost of
improving oppnet security and privacy by using SP2O. We believe that this overhead is reasonable
for the higher level of security. So, we have a trade-off of overhead versus security. For some
applications, this price might be acceptable while for others it might not.
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Figure 7.6. Success rate overheads for the proposed SP2O system vs. the baseline system.

7.2.3.

Average Times to Succeed

This subsection presents the average times to succeed for the baseline system and the proposed
SP2O system, and the compares them.

28

The overall average success rate overhead for all areas (in Fig. 7.6) is calculated as follows: (15% + 17% + 22% +
26%) / 4 = 20%.
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7.2.3.1. Average Times to Succeed for the Baseline System
Fig. 7.7 depicts that the average times to succeed for all areas increase with the number of PHs.
For the smallest area (300x300), the average times increase linearly with the number of PHs from
10 to 40, and then saturate. For the 400x400 area, the average times increase linearly for PHs from
20 to 40, and then saturate. Note that for this area (400x400) there is no data point for 10 PHs (cf.
success rate equal to 0 in Fig. 4.4). Also, the curves for the largest areas behave similarly as for
the success rates, which initially increase less than linearly, then linearly, and finally saturate.
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Figure 7.7. Average times to succeed vs. the number of PHs for the baseline system
(using different area sizes and single Target Node).
We observe that for most cases for a given number of PHs (40-100), the average times to
succeed have the highest values for the largest areas and the lowest values for the smallest areas.
This is expected, though contrary to what happened for the success rates. For instance, the success
rate curve for the 600x600 area is the lowest in Figure 7.3 while the average-times-to-succeed
curve for the 600x600 area is the highest in Figure 7.7.
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7.2.3.2. Average Times to Succeed for the Proposed SP2O System
Fig. 7.8 depicts that the average times to succeed for all area sizes increase with the number of
PHs.
We observe that for most cases for a given number of PHs (40-100), the average times have
the highest values for the largest areas while they have the lowest values for the smallest areas.
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Figure 7.8. Average times to succeed vs. the number of PHs for the proposed SP2O
system (using different area sizes and a single target node).

7.2.3.3. Comparison and Average Time Overhead
Fig. 7.9 shows a comparison between the average times to succeed for the baseline system
(broken lines) and the proposed SP2O system (solid lines). This comparison combines Figures 7.7
and 7.9 for readers’ convenience.
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Figure 7.9. Comparison of average times to succeed between the baseline system and the
proposed SP2O system.
Fig.7.10 presents average-time-to-succeed overheads for the proposed SP2O system vs. the
baseline system. (The overhead is calculated in a similar way to the calculation for the average
success rate overhead, as described in Subsection 7.2.2.3.)
Compared to the baseline system, SP2O introduces the overheads for average time to succeed
equal to 22% for the 300x300 area, 24% for the 400x400 area, 23% for the 500x500 area, and 22%
for the 600x600 area. The overall average overhead for time to succeed for all areas is 23%. It is
the cost of improving oppnet security and privacy by using SP2O. This is a trade-off of overhead
versus security and privacy. We believe that this overhead is reasonable for the higher level of
security and privacy.
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Figure 7.10. Average time overheads for the proposed SP2O system vs. the baseline
system.

7.2.4.

The Impact of Increasing the Number of Target Nodes on
Success Rates

This subsection presents the impact of increasing the number of the target nodes (TN) on the
success rates for the baseline system and the proposed SP2O system and compares them assuming
that the oppnet operation area is 600x600.

7.2.4.1. The Impact of Increasing the Number of Target Nodes on Success
Rates for the Baseline System
Fig. 7.11 shows that for the a given number of PHs from 40 to 100, the success rates increase
initially less than linearly with the number of target nodes, then linearly, and then saturate. Note
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that, no oppnets succeed in this area for the low number of PHs (10 to 30), so the success rates are
equal to 0% for these numbers of PHs.
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Figure 7.11. The impact of increasing the number of the target nodes on the success rates
for the baseline system (Area: 600x600).
These results are as expected. We deployed the Target Nodes (TN) on the corners of the area
networks, which creates the worst-case situation for oppnet to reach its goal.29

7.2.4.2. The Impact of Increasing the Number of Target Nodes on the
Success Rates for the Proposed SP2O System
Fig. 7.12 shows that for the number of PHs from 40 to 100, the success rates increase less than
linearly with the number of target nodes. Note that the oppnet fails to succeed (success rates equal
to 0), for the numbers of PHs equal 10 to 30 (due to the low density of PHs).

29

With the seed in the center, the distance from the seed to one of the target nodes is maximal.
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Success Rate vs. Number of Potential Helpers (Area: 600x600)
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Figure 7.12. The impact of increasing the number of the target nodes on the success rates
for the proposed SP2O system (Area: 600x600).

7.2.4.3. Comparison of the Impact of Increasing the Number of Target Nodes
on Success Rates
Fig. 7.13 shows the impact of increasing the number of the target nodes on the success rates
for the baseline system (broken lines) and the proposed SP2O system (solid lines), combining the
two previous figures.
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Figure 7.13. Comparison of the impact of increasing the number of the target nodes on
the success rates for the baseline system and the proposed SP2O system.
Fig. 7.13 compares the impacts of increasing the number of the target nodes (TNs) on the
success rates for the proposed SP2O system vs. the baseline system assuming the 600x600 area
for oppnet activities. Due to overheads, when compared to the baseline system, the SP2O success
rates are lower by 26% for 1 TN, 22% for 2 TNs, 19% for 3 TNs, and 18% for 4 TNs.
The overall overhead for SP2O for average success rates across all numbers of TNs is 21%. It
is the cost of improving oppnet security and privacy by SP2O as compared to the baseline system.
For some applications, this price might be acceptable while for others it might not.
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Figure 7.14. The overhead of the impact of increasing the number of the target nodes on
the success rates (Area: 600x600).

7.2.5.

The Impact of Increasing the Number of Target Nodes on
Average Times to Succeed

This subsection presents the impact of increasing the number of target nodes on the average
times to succeed for the baseline system and the proposed SP2O system and compares the systems
assuming using the 600x600 area.

7.2.5.1. The Impact of Increasing the Number of Target Nodes on Average
Times to Succeed for the Baseline System
Fig. 7.15 shows that for the number of PHs from 40 to 100, the average times to succeed
decrease with the number of target nodes; they decrease linearly for PHs of 40 to 80, less than
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linearly for PHs of 80 to 90, and then start to saturate. Note that the success rates for the numbers
of PHs equal to 10 to 30 are 0.
These results are as expected. We distributed the target nodes on the corners of the simulation
areas, which is the worst-case situation for the oppnet to reach its goal.
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Figure 7.15. Average time to succeed vs. the number of PHs for the proposed SP2O
system (using different area sizes).

7.2.5.2. The Impact of Increasing the Number of Target Nodes on Average
Times to Succeed for the Proposed SP2O System
Fig. 7.16 shows that for the numbers of PHs from 40 to 100, the average times decrease with
the number of target nodes similarly as for the baseline system. The curves increase linearly for
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PHs of 40 to 80, less than linearly for PHs of 80 to 90, and then start to saturate. Note that the
success rates for the numbers of PHs equal to 10 to 30 are 0.
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Figure 7.16. The impact of increasing the number of the target nodes on the average
times to succeed for the proposed SP2O system (Area: 600x600).

7.2.5.3. Comparison of the Impact of Increasing the Number of Target Nodes
on Average Times to Succeed
Fig. 7.17 compares the impact of increasing the number of the target nodes on the average
times to succeed for the baseline system (broken lines) and the proposed SP2O system (solid lines).
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Figure 7.17. Comparison of the impact of increasing the number of the target nodes on the
average time to succeed for the baseline system and the proposed SP2O System.
Fig. 7.18 shows overheads of the impact of increasing the number of the target nodes (TNs)
on the average times to succeed for the proposed SP2O system vs. the baseline system using the
600x600 area. Compared to the baseline, the SP2O produces overhead of the average time to
succeed equal to 22% for 1 TN, 23% for 2 TNs, 23% for 3 TNs, and 23% for 4 TNs.
Therefore, the overall average time overhead for all areas is 23%. It is the cost of improving
oppnet security and privacy by using SP2O. For some applications, this price might be acceptable
while for others it might not.
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Figure 7.18. The overhead of the impact of increasing the number of the target nodes on
the average time to succeed (Area: 600x600).

7.2.6.

The Impact of Increasing the Ratio of Oppnet-Enabled
Potential Helpers on Success Rates

This subsection presents the impact of increasing a ratio of the oppnet-enabled PHs on the
success rates for the baseline system and the proposed SP2O system and the compares them,
assuming 50 PHs and a single target node.
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7.2.6.1. The Impact of Increasing the Ratio of Oppnet-Enabled Potential
Helpers on Success Rates for the Baseline System
Fig. 7.19 shows that for all area sizes, increasing the ratio of oppnet-enabled potential helpers
increases the success rates. For the (300x300) area, there is no success rate for PHs ratio of 10 to
20; the success rate increases linearly with PHs ratio of 20 to 40; and more than linearly for PHs
ratio of 40 to 100. For the 400x400 area, there is no success rate for PHs ratio of 10 to 30; the
success rate increases linearly with PHs ratio of 30 to 60; and more than linearly with PHs ratio of
60 to 100. For the 500x500 area, there is no success rate with PHs ratio of 10 to 45; the success
rate increases less than linearly for PHs ratio of 45 to 70; linearly for PHs ratio of 70 to 80, and
more than linearly with PHs ratio of 80 to 100. For the (600x600) area, there is no success rate for
PHs ratio of 10 to 70; the success rate increases less than linearly with PHs ratio of 70 to 100.
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Figure 7.19. The impact of increasing the ratio of the oppnet-enabled PHs on the success
rates for the baseline system (using 50 PHs and a single Target Node).
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7.2.6.2. The Impact of Increasing the Ratio of Oppnet-Enabled Potential
Helpers on Success Rates for the Proposed SP2O System
Fig. 7.20 shows that for all area sizes, increasing the ratio of oppnet-enabled potential helpers
increases the success rates. For the (300x300) area, there is no success rate for PHs ratio of 10 to
20; the success rate increases linearly with PHs ratio of 20 to 40; and more than linearly for PHs
ratio of 40 to 100. For the 400x400 area, there is no success rate for PHs ratio of 10 to 30; the
success rate increases linearly with PHs ratio of 30 to 60; and more than linearly with PHs ratio of
60 to 100. For the 500x500 area, there is no success rate with PHs ratio of 10 to 45; the success
rate increases less than linearly for PHs ratio of 45 to 70; linearly for PHs ratio of 70 to 80, and
more than linearly with PHs ratio of 80 to 100. For the (600x600) area, there is no success rate for
PHs ratio of 10 to 70; the success rate increases less than linearly with PHs ratio of 70 to 100.
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Figure 7.20. The impact of increasing the ratio of the oppnet-enabled PHs on the success
rates for the proposed SP2O system (using 50 PHs and a single Target Node).
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7.2.6.3. Comparison of the Impact of Increasing the Ratio of OppnetEnabled Potential Helpers on Success Rates
Fig. 7.21 compares the impact of increasing the ratio of the oppnet-enabled PHs on the success
rates for the baseline system (broken lines) and the proposed SP2O system (solid lines).
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Figure 7.21. Comparison of the impact of increasing the ratio of oppnet-enabled PHs on
success rates for the baseline system and the proposed SP2O system (using 50 PHs and a
single Target Node).
As Fig. 7.22 shows, compared to the baseline system, the SP2O success rate overhead is 16%
for the 300x300 area, 17% for the 400x400 area, 21% for the 500x500 area, and 13% for the
600x600 area.
The overall average success rate overhead for all areas is 18%. It is the cost of improving
oppnet security and privacy by using SP2O.
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Figure 7.22. The overhead of the impact of increasing the ratio of the oppnet-enabled PHs
on the success rates (using 50 PHs and a single Target Node).

7.2.7.

The Impact of Increasing the Ratio of Oppnet-Enabled
Potential Helpers on Average Times to Succeed

This subsection presents the impact of increasing the ratio of oppnet-enabled PHs on the
average time to succeed for the baseline system and the proposed SP2O system and compares
them, assuming 50 PHs and a single target node.

7.2.7.1. The Impact of Increasing the Ratio of Oppnet-Enabled Potential
Helpers on Average Times to Succeed for the Baseline System
Fig. 7.23 shows that for all area sizes, increasing the ratio of oppnet-enabled PHs increases the
average times to succeed. For the 300x300 area, the average times increase linearly for the oppnet-
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enabled PH ratios from 30 to 90; and then start to saturate. For the 400x400 area, the average times
increase linearly for the oppnet-enabled PH ratios from 40 to 90; and less than linearly for PHs
ratio of 90 to 100. For the 500x500 area, the average times increase linearly for the oppnet-enabled
PH ratios from 50 to 90. For the 600x600 area, the average times increases linearly for the oppnetenabled PH ratios from 70 to 90.
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Figure 7.23. The impact of increasing the ratio of the oppnet-enabled PHs on the average
time to succeed for the baseline system (using 50 PHs and a single Target Node).

7.2.7.2. The Impact of Increasing the Ratio of Oppnet-Enabled Potential
Helpers on Average Times to Succeed for the Proposed SP2O System
In Fig. 7.24 shows that for all area sizes, similarly to the baseline system, the curves increase
almost linearly when the ratio of oppnet-enabled PHs is increased.
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Figure 7.24. The impact of increasing the ratio of the oppnet-enabled PHs on the average
times to succeed for the proposed SP2O system (using 50 PHs and a single Target Node).

7.2.7.3. Comparison of the Impact of Increasing Ratio of Oppnet-Enabled
Potential Helpers on Average Time to Succeed
Fig. 7.25 compares the impact of increasing the ratio of the oppnet-enabled PHs on the average
times to succeed for the baseline system (broken lines) and the proposed SP2O system (solid lines).
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Figure 7.25. Comparison of the impact of increasing the ratio of the oppnet-enabled PHs on
the average time to succeed for the baseline system and the proposed System (using 50 PHs,
and a single target node).
Fig. 7.26 presents the overheads for the impacts of increasing the ratios of the oppnet-enabled
PHs on the average times to succeed (using 50 PHs, and a single target node). Compared to the
baseline, the overhead of the SP2O average time to succeed equals to 23% for the 300x300 area,
23% for the 400x400 area, 23% for the 500x500 area, and 23% for the 600x600 area. Therefore,
the overall average time overhead for all areas is 23%.

133

Average Time to Succeed vs. Ratio of Oppnet-enabled PHs
1
0.9

0.7
0.6
0.5
26%
24%
23%
23%

24%
24%
22%
23%

24%
24%
23%
23%

24%
23%
23%

25%
24%
22%
21%

0.2

24%
22%
23%

0.3

21%
21%

0.4
18%

Average Time [ms]

0.8

70

80

90

100

0.1
0
10

20

30

40

50

60

Ratio of Oppnet-enabled Potential Helpers [%]
Aera 300X300

Area 400X400

Area 500X500

Area 600X600

Figure 7.26. The overhead of the impact of increasing the ratio of the oppnet-enabled PHs
on the average time to succeed (using 50 PHs, and a single target node).

7.3. Chapter Conclusions
This chapter presented the simulation results and discussed them. The main results show that
the overheads for average success rates and average times to succeed introduced by SP2OA are
20% and 23%, respectively. These overheads are the cost to be paid for the higher level of security
and privacy. This is a tradeoff between a security gain and the system performance cost. These
costs should be acceptable for most applications though might be unacceptable for others (who
will risk security to improve performance).
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CHAPTER 8

CONCLUSIONS, SIGNIFICANCE AND EXPECTED
IMPACTS, AND FUTURE WORK

8.1. Introduction
This chapter presents the conclusions, outlines the significance of this work and its expected
impacts, and proposes future work to extend the presented results.

8.2. Conclusions
We have proposed a Secure Privacy-Preserving Oppnet (SP2O) architecture, which integrates
two subsystems also proposed here: PTF-based Oppnets Architecture (POA) and ADB-based
Oppnet Scheme (AOS). We presented conceptual designs for the POA and AOS systems. POA
ensures secure interactions among various oppnet entities in the face of its ad hoc growth. AOS
protects sensitive data exchanged among all entities of an Oppnet during its entire lifecycle.
To evaluate the performance of the proposed SP2O solution, simulations were run for two
oppnet systems: an original oppnet and SP2OA. The former system was considered to be the
baseline to which SP2OA was compared. Simulation experiments were designed, implemented
and run for both systems. The main results show that the overheads for average success rates and
average times to succeed introduced by SP2OA are 20% and 23%, respectively. These overheads
are the cost to be paid for the higher level of security and privacy. This is a tradeoff between a
security gain and the system performance cost. These costs should be acceptable for most
applications though might be unacceptable for others (who will risk security to improve
performance).
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8.3. Significance and Expected Impacts
Previous work on oppnets provided no discussion or solutions for security and privacy,
though emphasizing that they are essential for the oppnet success and thus badly needed. This
Dissertation uses a uniform trust basis (called Pervasive Trust Foundation) for a secure and
privacy-preserving architecture for oppnets called Secure Privacy-Preserving Oppnet (SP2O)
Architecture.
The proposed SP2O architecture is expected to have the following positive impacts:
A) Ensuring secure interactions among various oppnet entities in the face of its ad hoc growth.
B) Protecting sensitive data exchanged among all entities of an oppnet during its entire
lifecycle.
C) Boosting the security and privacy capabilities of oppnets and the oppnet entities that
interact with them.

8.4. Future Work
The future work should address the following research issues:
1) Protecting helpers from oppnets and the environment.
2) Protecting the environment from oppnets and their helpers [LiKG06].
3) Developing a comprehensive simulation for the ADB-based Oppnet Scheme or AOS (as a
component of the fully implemented and simulated SP2O system) and investigating the
feasibility and effectiveness of this solution.
4) Investigating various helper search methods that can be used in the process of oppnet
expansion (determining which oppnet node has its turn to invite the next potential helper and
which of its discovered neighbor candidate helper should be invited next).
5) Proposing a taxonomy of oppnet-benefiting applications. There are at least two types of such
applications [Lili18]:
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a) The applications in which having more helpers (of any type) means a shorter time to
succeed in completing an oppnet job. For example, if a job can be divided into 1 million
easy sub-tasks (and any helper can do each task), then having 1 million helpers increases
the oppnet’s success ratio. In this case there no saturation of success rates occurs.
b) The applications in which reaching just one helper (maybe one of many) with a specific
resource means success. In this case, a higher total number of helpers does not increase the
oppnet’s success ratio significantly (they may contribute to success ratio only by being
forwarders of the task to the helper with the specific-resource); in this case, the saturation
of success ratio is reached at a certain point.
6) Implementing a pilot SP2O system with actual devices instead of simulated devices.
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APPENDIX A

FIRST-GENERATION OVM PRIMITIVES
This appendix presents the partial lists of the first-generation OVM primitives of the oppnet nodes,
as defined in References [KGLY07, KLGY08, LGKY10] and discussed in Subsection 1.3.3.

Table A.1. Partial list of OVM primitives for CC nodes.
Name of the Primitive
CTRL_initiate
CTRL_terminate
CTRL_command

Functions of the Primitive
Initiate oppnet
Terminate oppnet
Send commend to seed nodes

Table A.2. Partial list of OVM primitives for seed oppnet nodes.
Name of the Primitive
SEED_scan
SEED_discover
SEED_listen
SEED_validate
SEED_isMember
SEED_evaluateAdmit
SEED_sendTask
SEED_delegateTask
SEED_release
SEED_processMsg
SEED_report
SEED_update
SEED_receiveTask
SEED_wait
SEED_barrier

Functions of the Primitive
Scan communication spectrum to detect devices
that could become candidate helpers
Discover candidate helpers with a specific
communication mechanism
Receive and save messages in buffer
Verify the received command
Checks if a device is already an oppnet node
(oppnet member)
Evaluate a device and admit it into oppnet if the
device meets criteria for admittance
Send a task to other oppnet device
Delegate a task that requires a permission from the
delegating entity
Release a helper when no longer needed
Process a message from buffer
Report information to control center/coordinator
Update a device in the oppnet with new
expectations
Receive task from control center or another seed
Wait for a certain amount of time before take
another action
Block the caller until all devices specified in the
input parameter have called it
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Table A.3. Partial list of OVM primitives for oppnet helpers.
Name of the Primitive
HLPR_isMember
HLPR_joinOppnet
HLPR_scan
HLPR_discover
HLPR_validate
HLPR_switchMode
HLPR_report
HLPR_selectTask
HLPR_listen
HLPR_evaluateAdmit
HLPR_runApplication
HLPR_release
HLPR_processMsg
HLPR_sendData
HLPR_leave
HLPR_strongTask

HLPR_weakTask

HLPR_assignStrongTask
HLPR_assignWeakTask

Functions of the Primitive
Test if a helper is already a member of oppnet
Join oppnet
Scan communication spectrum to detect devices
that could become candidate helpers (regular or
lites)
Discover candidate helpers with a specified
communication mechanism
Verify the received command
Switch between helpers’ regular application and
oppnet application
Send information/data to specified device
Select a task from the task queue to execute
Receive message and save it
Evaluate a candidate helper and admit it into
oppnet if it meets criteria defined by oppnet
Execute application indicated by authorized
oppnet seed or helper node
Release a helper (unless delegated a release task,
a helper H can release only helpers admitted by
H)
Process a message from buffer
Send information/data to specified authorized
oppnet node
Inform a seed that the caller will quit oppnet
Respond to the request sent from device and
express the willingness to join oppnet. By
accepting this task, the device will abort previous
task
Respond to the request sent from device and
express the willingness to join oppnet. By
accepting this task, the device will put the task in
a queue
Assign tasks to a device. If accepted, the task will
interrupt the previous task at the device
Assign tasks to a device. If accepted, the task will
be queued
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Table A.4. Partial list of OVM primitives for lightweight oppnet helpers.
Name of the Primitive

Functions of the Primitive

LITE_isMember
LITE_joinOppnet
LITE_validate
LITE_switchMode

Test if a lite is already a member of oppnet
Join oppnet
Verify the received command
Switch between lites’ regular application and
oppnet application
LITE_report
Send information/data to specified device
LITE_selectTask
Select a task from the task queue to execute
LITE_listen
Receive message and save it
LITE_runApplication Execute application indicated by authorized oppnet
seed or helper node
LITE_processMsg
Process a message from buffer
LITE_sendData
Send information/data to specified authorized
oppnet node
LITE_leave
Inform a seed that the caller will quit oppnet
LITE_strongTask
Respond to the request sent from device and express
the willingness to join oppnet. By accepting this task,
the device will abort previous task
LITE_weakTask
Respond to the request sent from device and express
the willingness to join oppnet. By accepting this task,
the device will put the task in a queue
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APPENDIX B

EXAMPLES OF SIMULATION OUTPUTS
This appendix presents samples of simulation outputs for both the baseline system and the
proposed SP2O system, both discussed in Chapter 7. Fig. B.1 depicts an example of the
configuration output for the oppnet simulation of the baseline system.30 This example simulates
20 oppnet nodes including the Seed (Wristband) and a single Target Node (Smartphone) in the
area size (300x300). Note that table in this output is similar to Table 5.1 in Chapter 5.

Figure B.1. Configuration output of the baseline oppnet simulation.

30

The output for the proposed SP2O system is nearly identical (it differs only in having "P" instead of "b" in the 11 th
row).
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Fig. B.2 depicts an example of the output of the oppnet simulation for the baseline system. It
uses 20 oppnet nodes, including the Seed (Wristband) and the 4 Target Nodes (Smartphones)
in the smallest simulated area (300x300). In this example, the success rate is 70% and the average
time to succeed is 335 ms. (as shown in the two bottom lines of this output).

Figure B.2. The output of the oppnet simulation for the baseline system.

Fig. B.3 depicts an example of the output of the oppnet simulation for the proposed SP2O
system. It shows that some of the Potential Helpers (PH-ID: 19, 4, 25, 32, and 45) are
not trusted (Untrusted). It also shows the sequence of helper invitations. Rows 2-8 list helpers
of Level 0, which invited by the seed node (Node ID = 0). In turn, the nodes that become
helpers at Level 0 invite their own helpers; the latter are considered for becoming helpers at
Level 1. The nodes that become Level 1 helpers, can invite Level 2 helpers, and so on till
one or more target nodes are reached. Please note that nodes (PHs) with their Trust Vales (Tv)
below Trust Threshold marked as "Untrusted" are rejected, so they never become helpers.
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Figure B.3. The output of the oppnet simulation for the proposed SP2O system.
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